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ABSTRACT 
 
This study sought to explore the factors that influence the creation and 
maintenance of Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOADs). Semi-
structured interviews were conducted and data was analyzed following the principles of 
Grounded Theory as outlined by Charmaz (2006). Seventeen individuals were selected 
based on their involvement in five LVOADs within FEMA’s Region VIII. It was found 
that creation factors held a high degree of consistency LVOAD-to-LVOAD, but the 
maintenance factors suffered from a limited number of available LVOADs that 
progressed to the maintenance stage. Findings suggest communities require multiple 
hazard events, strong leadership, and a formal organizational structure to develop 
LVOADs and they are difficult to maintain. Throughout creation, LVOADs face a 
number of barriers including burnout, turnover, and turf issues. During maintenance, 
LVOADs attempted to counteract barriers by offering value with membership. This study 
concludes with implications for emergency management practice and the academic 
discipline. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This study will explore how local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 
(LVOAD(s)) are created and maintained. A LVOAD is an organization that provides 
both a form and forum for communication, collaboration, and cooperation amongst 
organizations involved in the response to and recovery from disasters within a given 
community (National Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster, n.d.). The members of 
these organizations are primarily nonprofit organizations (NPOs). This research will 
explore the following specific questions related to LVOADs: 
1.      What facilitates the creation of LVOADs? 
2.      What facilitates and hinders the maintenance of LVOADs? 
The goal of this research is to develop an understanding of how these organizations are 
developed and maintained.  
 This chapter provides a brief background related to NPO roles in disasters and the 
conditions and events that led to the development of the LVOAD concept. In light of this 
background, the potential significance of this study for emergency management theory 
and practice are discussed.  
Background 
Nonprofit organizations (NPOs) are the primary members of LVOADs. There are 
a variety of terms used to describe NPOs including voluntary agencies (VOLAGs), faith-
based organizations (FBOs), and community-based organizations (CBOs), to name a few 
(Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011; Sylves, 2008). Regardless of the term used to describe 
them, there are characteristics germane to these types of organizations. For instance, an 
organization must be incorporated under law to be considered a tax-exempt not-for-profit 
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(Sylves, 2008; Wolf, 1999). And, to achieve such status under the law, organizations 
must be self-governing, agree not to profit from the services they offer, and have an 
organizational mission directed at serving the public good in some way (Ott, 2001; 
Sylves, 2008; Wolf, 1999). NPOs are similar in that fulfillment of their mission involves 
one or more constituency groups (e.g., a board of directors, service recipients, volunteers, 
the public in the communities they serve) and all NPOs strive to meet their needs and 
interests (Ott, 2001; Wolf, 1999). NPO involvement in disasters is often grounded in their 
organizational mission and constituencies such as they define them. 
NPOs have played a prominent role in the aftermath of disasters throughout the 
history of the United States. Early in the twentieth century, before government at any 
level accepted responsibility for addressing disaster-related needs, NPOs were providing 
valuable services to impacted communities (Kreps, 1990; Pipa, 2006; Rubin, 2007). 
Among the services that NPOs provide to individuals and households are basic 
necessities (e.g., food, water, clothing), temporary shelter, financial assistance, childcare, 
case management, mental health services, medical care, reunification services, donations 
management, volunteer coordination, debris removal, and rebuilding/reconstruction 
(ASPE, 2008; Fagnoni, 2006; Phillips & Jenkins, 2008; Smith, 2012). Thus, NPOs have 
been, and remain today, an integral and necessary component of disaster assistance in the 
United States (Smith, 2012). 
 Yet, throughout most of the history of their involvement in the aftermath of 
disasters, NPOs have operated independent of one another as they offer services after 
disaster (Smith, 2012; Sylves, 2008). And, for all the assistance they provide, NPO 
efforts to assist impacted communities after disaster have been stymied time and again by 
	   3 
problems stemming from a lack of coordination. As Smith (2012) stated, “when [NPOs] 
act alone, then, their contributions may be underused or may even have unintended 
consequences” (p. 145). Some of the issues associated with a failure to coordinate NPO 
efforts in the aftermath of disasters have included duplication of efforts, wasted 
resources, individuals and households left with unmet needs, and continued or 
exacerbated exposure of vulnerable populations to natural hazards (Smith, 2012). One or 
more mechanisms to coordinate the provision of NPO services in disaster-impacted 
communities has been needed for a long time, but relative to the history of their 
involvement in disasters, it is only recently that these organizations have begun to 
develop formal mechanisms to coordinate their efforts.  
The Development of VOADs 
Issues stemming from a lack of coordination amongst nonprofit organizations 
(NPOs) have for a long time limited NPO contributions in the aftermath of disasters (see 
for instance Lester’s (2000) review of the Galveston Hurricane of 1900, Barry’s (1997) 
discussion of the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, and McCullough’s (1968) discussion 
of the Johnstown Flood). Yet, while frustration had built within the NPO community over 
time, it was not until Hurricane Camille that the NPO community began to seriously 
pursue a means to coordinate their efforts. Hurricane Camille was a powerful and 
destructive hurricane that impacted a densely populated area along the Gulf Coast in 
1969 (National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d., Simpson, 1998). NPOs 
that responded to the disaster observed that their desire to help impacted communities 
was not realized to the extent it could have been due to coordination problems (Egan & 
Tischler, 2010; Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011; Sylves, 2008). Representatives from those 
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NPOs began to regularly meet to discuss their “respective activities, concerns, and 
frustrations so that duplication of effort could be minimized and [their efforts] made more 
efficient (sic)” (Sylves, 2008, p. 4). These meetings led to the creation of an organization 
known as National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) (Egan & 
Tischler, 2010; Smith, 2011). NVOAD officially formed in 1970. The organization’s 
mission is to “serve as the forum where organizations share knowledge and resources 
throughout the disaster cycle - preparation, response, and recovery - to help disaster 
survivors and their communities” (National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, 
n.d.). NVOAD rallies around the goals of communication, collaboration, cooperation, and 
coordination, termed “the 4cs”, as the primary means, when achieved, of increasing 
efficiency and eliminating duplication of resources in times of disaster (Egan & Tischler, 
2010; National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.). It is important to note 
that, while the NVOAD website regularly references the “4cs,” they never provide a 
definition for any of the four words (National Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster, n.d.). To be clear, NVOAD does not manage disaster response and recovery 
efforts as an organization or on behalf of its member organizations; rather, it provides a 
forum pre-, during, and post-disaster for member organizations to work together so that 
their individual contributions to impacted communities can be maximized (Sylves, 2008). 
Additional benefits of membership in NVOAD include participation in joint planning 
through NVOAD committees and task forces, access to information (e.g., newsletters, 
research), leadership development opportunities, conferences, seminars, and training 
programs (Sylves, 2008). 
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It stands to reason that if all NPOs were able to work effectively through one 
national level organization, the potential for improved coordination would be high; 
however, all NPOs are not, and cannot be NVOAD members. NVOAD originally 
consisted of only seven national level NPO disaster relief organizations (Egan & 
Tischler, 2010; Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2011; National Voluntary Organizations 
Active in Disaster, n.d.). Since its inception, it has grown to include more than 50 
national level member organizations (Egan & Tischler, 2010; National Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.). Yet, NPOs have to meet criteria related to their 
pre- and post-disaster involvement and capacity to be a member; and, due to these 
criteria, relatively few organizations qualify for membership. See Table 1 for criteria 
related to NVOAD membership as described on the NVOAD website (n.d.). 
 
Table 1. Criteria for NVOAD membership (National Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster, n.d.). 
 
Tier One  
Member Level 
• 5 separate responses within 3 years and 
• Active participation in 10 state VOADS and 
• Active participation in at least one National VOAD committee 
 
In addition, Tier One members must meet one or more of the 
following: 
• A total organizational budget in excess of $15 million Or 
• A total number of staff and volunteers in excess of 2,500 Or 
• Proven disaster experience of at least 15 years 
Tier Two 
Member Level 
• 3 separate responses within 3 years and 
• Active involvement in 5 state VOAD’s and 
• Active participation in at least one National VOAD committee 
 
In addition, Tier Two members must meet one or more of the 
following: 
• A total organizational budget of at least $1 million or 
• A total number of staff and volunteers in excess of 300 
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In addition to the membership options stated in Table 1, NVOAD also has 
associate positions available for organizations that do not have disaster specific missions, 
as well as partnerships with private and governmental organizations (National Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.). NVOAD actions are guided by their by-laws and 
decisions are made through a democratic majority voting process restricted to the 
directors (National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, 2013). This voting 
process is carried out by the NVOAD leadership, which consists of four elected officers 
(chairman, vice chairman, secretary, and treasurer) and a board of directors (National 
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, 2013). The officers and board members are 
either representatives of state/territorial VOAD or NVOAD member organizations 
(National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.). While the creation of 
NVOAD represented an advance in the coordination of NPO efforts after a disaster, one 
or more accessible coordination mechanisms were still needed. 
In addition to the need for accessible coordination mechanisms, coordination was 
needed at other levels. The scope of NVOAD is national, as the name suggests; and, its 
members must, to some extent, have a national reach. While coordination of national 
level NPO efforts is certainly important, it is not adequate. Disasters are largely localized 
events that are handled primarily at the community level (Hy & Waugh, 1990; Sylves, 
2008; Waugh, 2000). Within local contexts, small community-based NPOs or local 
chapters of larger regional or national NPOs have much to offer, but are also prone to 
some of the problems associated with a lack of coordination referred to previously (Pipa, 
2006; Smith, 2012). 
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When the NVOAD model was adapted to and implemented at the local, regional 
and state levels beginning in the 1980s, the coordination gap for NPOs began to be 
addressed. Where implemented, the newly formed organizations mimicked NVOAD’s 
mission, values, and structure (National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, 
n.d.). Currently, in addition to NVOAD, each of the states and territories in the United 
States has a State Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (SVOAD) (Egan & 
Tischler, 2010; National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.). There is no 
data to suggest how many Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOADs) 
exist to date. Both SVOAD and LVOAD are new and under-researched. As Gazley 
(2013) explains, this lack of research is perhaps due to “the youth of many statewide 
[VOADs], but also their decentralized and unregulated nature” (p. 4). Although the 
response and recovery literature sometimes mentions SVOADs and LVOADs when 
discussing NPO involvement in disaster (see for example: Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 
2011; Phillips, 2009), these organizations are most often ignored entirely.  
Conclusion 
 A basic assumption of emergency management is that the responsibility for 
managing disasters lies primarily at the local level. Effectively meeting this responsibility 
requires local resources to be coordinated pre-, during, and post-disaster. Nonprofit 
organizations (NPOs) provide a range of important resources to disaster impacted 
communities; and, Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOADs) are 
intended to coordinate NPO efforts. Yet, despite their potentially important role, little is 
known about how LVOADs are created and maintained. This study addressed this gap 
and the following chapters explain how it did so.  
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Chapter Two reviews the literature that sensitize the researcher to the context in 
which LVOADs are needed and emerge; and, Chapter Three presents the research 
methods that were employed in this study. Chapter Four explores the factors that 
influence the creation of LVOADs and the barriers that stand in the way of LVOAD 
creation. Chapter Five presents the barriers LVOADs face once maintenance begins and 
the ways the LVOADs attempt to counteract these barriers. Chapter Six discusses the 
findings and implications for the creation and maintenance of future LVOADs, as well as 
a discussion of this study’s limitations. Chapter Seven concludes this study with a 
discussion of the importance of this topic and the implications for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 	  
No empirical research has explicitly examined the creation and maintenance of 
Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOADs). Thus, the following 
literature review is not intended to explain how this study relates to an existing body of 
work or to present an empirical foundation for this study’s research design (Maxwell, 
2005). Instead, consistent with the grounded theory methodological approach that this 
study will employ (Charmaz, 2006), this chapter reviews literature that sensitize the 
researcher to the context within which LVOADs are needed and emerge. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the need for, and challenges associated with, a wide range of 
organizational involvement in the aftermath of disasters including nonprofit organizations 
(NPOs). The second section examines the disaster assistance framework in the United 
States and the critical role that NPOs play within it. The third section discusses how the 
nature of NPOs both necessitates coordination amongst them in the aftermath of disaster 
while at the same time making such coordination difficult. 
A Brief Overview of Disaster Response 
Scholars do not agree on all of the specific characteristics that define a disaster 
(see for example: Alexander, 2005; Britton, 2005; Cutter, 2005; Dombrowsky, 2005; 
Jigyasu, 2005; Perry, 2005; Quarantelli, 1998). Yet, they do agree on the notion that 
disasters are nonroutine, disruptive events (see for example: Auf der Heide, 1989; Fritz, 
1961, Quarantelli, 1998); and, further, that due to their nonroutine, disruptive nature, the 
efforts of the organizations that are typically involved in the response to everyday 
emergencies and the typical response structures and processes they use are not sufficient 
to meeting disaster-related needs (see for example: Auf der Heide, 1989, Kreps & 
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Bosworth, 1994; Perry, 1991; Stallings, 2005). Although emergencies are also disruptive, 
the needs and impacts associated with these events allow first responder organizations, 
such as police, fire, and emergency medical service personnel, to manage the event in 
keeping with their previous training and experience, as tradition or local ordinance 
dictate, with little need for coordination among them, and with the help of little or no 
outside resources (Auf der Heide, 1989; Hoetmer, 1991). However, when faced with an 
increase in routine tasks and activities combined with the introduction of new, non-
routine tasks and activities after disasters, outside help is required to meet disaster-related 
needs (Auf der Heide, 1989; Hoetmer, 1991). Outside help is intended to address the gap 
between what the impacted jurisdiction can do and what is needed; however, the extent to 
which outside help effectively and efficiently fills the gap varies with the ability of the 
impacted jurisdiction and assistance rendering entities to coordinate their efforts (Auf der 
Heide, 1989; Smith, 2011). 
While coordination of inter-organizational efforts is needed, it is difficult to bring 
about in practice due to the variation amongst the entities that may be involved in any 
given disaster and their organizational differences. Help responding to a disaster may 
arrive at the request of impacted jurisdictions or converge unrequested on site (Dynes & 
Quarantelli, 1980). Help can come in the form of information, material resources, money, 
volunteers, subject matter expertise, and/or of a range of services (Smith, 2011). And, the 
help may be provided by individuals, nonprofit organizations (NPOs), businesses, other 
local level governments, any number of domestic state and/or federal government 
agencies, and, sometimes, international governmental and/or nongovernmental 
organizations (Smith, 2011).  
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The entities that become involved in the aftermath of disasters have varying 
degrees of disaster experience (Auf der Heide, 1989; Brudney & Gazley, 2009; Drabek, 
1985, 1987; Majchrzak, Jarenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007; Stallings, 1978). Some of the 
entities may have been involved in the impacted community’s preparedness efforts (e.g., 
response plans, exercises, training) prior to a disaster and some may not have been (see 
for example: Brudney & Gazley, 2009; Dynes & Quarantelli, 1980; Gillespie, 1991; 
Gillespie & Banerjee, 1994; Gillespie & Streeter, 1987). The organizations tend to vary 
drastically in size and scope ranging from local organizations staffed by only a few 
individuals to national or international organizations with staff that range from hundreds 
to thousands (Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011). The organizations may rely wholly on 
professional staff, part professional staff and part volunteer, or entirely upon volunteers to 
provide assistance after disasters (Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011). They also have varying 
organizational missions, structures, cultures, values, ways of doing things, and types and 
levels of resources available to them in rendering assistance (see for example: Drabek, 
1983; 1985; 1987; Drabek et al., 1981; Dynes, 1970; Kennedy et al., 1969; Quarantelli, 
Dynes, & Haas, 1966; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Stallings, 1978). And, the exact mix of 
the entities involved in meeting needs after disasters varies over time. Some 
organizations are involved in the immediate hours and days after a disaster and then end 
their involvement, some begin only once immediate needs have been met, and some 
begin right away and continue providing assistance in the months and/or years after the 
event (Moore, 2006; Rubin, 2009; Smith, 2011).  
The entities that become involved in the aftermath of disaster provide needed 
resources that otherwise would not have been available to impacted communities (Dynes 
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& Quarantelli, 1980); yet, there is often difficulty in ensuring that the help they offer 
translates to effectively and efficiently meeting the range of needs that result from a given 
disaster (Alexander, 2010; Neal, 1994; Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011). All of the 
aforementioned differences across the entities involved at any given time in any given 
response and recovery process make coordination of their efforts both highly desirable 
and incredibly difficult (Auf der Heide, 1989; Smith, 2011). As a consequence, disaster 
response and recovery is often relatively piecemeal and uncoordinated (National 
Research Council, 2006; Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001). The lack of coordination 
commonly manifests in duplication of services, unnecessary waste, and unmet individual 
and community needs (ASPE, 2008; Chandra & Acosta, 2009; Klindt, 2010; Pipa, 2006; 
Smith, 2012).  
The federal government has initiated a number of efforts to address the 
coordination problem over time. For instance, the federal government has provided 
preparedness grants to state and local governments, training for those involved in 
response to and recovery from disasters, national frameworks and plans depicting how a 
coordinated intergovernmental efforts should work, and national incident management 
systems dictating structures and processes that all responding entities at all levels of 
government should use to coordinate their efforts (Rubin, 2009; Sylves, 2009). The 
federal government also created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
in large part, to help address intergovernmental coordination issues (Kreps, 1990; Miller, 
2009; Rubin, 2009). Yet, federal efforts have met with limited success (Comfort, 1988; 
Drabek, 1985; Schroeder, Wamsley, & Ward, 2001).   
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There are a number of reasons the federal government’s efforts have not been 
more successful, but there are three that are particularly important to address. First, the 
success of federal efforts relies on state and local buy-in and participation. Where state 
and local governments (and the emergency management relevant organizations within 
them) do not buy-in or participate, or do not do so fully, the coordination mechanisms put 
forth by the federal government fail to result in actual coordination in response and 
recovery (see for example: Comfort, 1988; Drabek, 1985; Sylves, 2009; Waugh and 
Strieb, 2006). The buy-in of state and local government is critical because our federalist 
form of government in the United States does not allow any level of government to force 
any other level of government to participate even though incentives and sanctions may be 
leveraged in an attempt to coerce them (Drabek, 1985; May, 1985; May & Williams, 
1986; Sylves, 1991; 2008; Waugh, 1988; 1993). The ability of state and local 
jurisdictions to coordinate their efforts does not depend solely on their buy-in into, or 
participation in, federal coordination mechanisms, but also the extent to which they 
prioritize emergency management, their risk perception, their disaster experience, the 
resources they have available, and the extent to which they engage in cross-jurisdictional 
preparedness activities, among other factors (see for example: Kettle, 2003; Labadie, 
1984; Mileti, 1980; 1999; Neal & Webb 2006; Patton et al., 2010; Petak, 1985; Schafer, 
Carroll, Haynes, & Abrams, 2008; Wolensky & Wolensky, 1990). Thus, regardless of 
any federal efforts to bring about coordination, any actual coordination that is evidenced 
in response and recovery is primarily the result of what is going on at the local and state 
levels.  
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Second, federal efforts have historically excluded NPOs from the process of 
developing coordination mechanisms (Sylves, 2009). As a result, the mechanisms 
developed have not been conducive to the integration of NPO efforts during response and 
recovery activities (Rubin, 2009); and have, in fact, failed to successfully integrate these 
organizations when put into practice during response and recovery efforts such as those 
related to Hurricane Katrina (see for example: Boris & Steuerle, 2006; Canclini et al., 
2009; De Vita & Kramer, 2008; Pipa, 2006; Simo & Bies, 2007). The federal 
coordination mechanisms themselves conflict with how NPO stakeholder organizations 
are structured, how they work, and what they value (Waugh & Tierney, 2007, p. 329).  
Third, the federal government’s coordinating mechanisms are designed to 
facilitate coordination across the entire response and recovery enterprise for any given 
disaster (e.g., across levels of government, businesses, and NPOs) as opposed to 
facilitating the coordination among specific kinds of groups who may be offering the 
same or similar kinds of disaster assistance (e.g., NPOs who become involved to provide 
basic necessities for individuals and households) (see for example: FEMA, 2008a; b; 
2011). Thus, the federal mechanisms are not even designed to comprehensively address 
coordination issues related to disasters.  
 Review of the literature suggests that disasters require the help of entities from 
within and outside an impacted jurisdiction and that the differences among the entities 
makes coordination of their efforts both necessary and difficult. While a variety of efforts 
to address this issue have been initiated by the federal government, they have never 
comprehensively addressed the problem, have not been designed with NPO input, and 
depend on local level conditions and participation (Palttala et al., 2012). It is within this 
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context that NPOs are involved in disasters and the potential of LVOADs becomes 
apparent. LVOADs are locally-based and designed to facilitate coordination both among 
NPOs and between NPOs and wider jurisdictional response and recovery efforts. The 
creation and maintenance of LVOADs in local jurisdictions may lessen the coordination 
problem that has historically thwarted the effectiveness and efficiency with which 
disaster-related needs are met. 
Disaster Assistance in the United States and the Role of Nonprofits 
Depending on the disaster, any number and range of impacts related to the social, 
political, economic, natural, and/or built system as well as any number and range of 
needs on the part of individuals and households, businesses, nonprofits (NPOs), and local 
government may need to be met (Alesch, Arendt, & Holly, 2008; Berke et al., 1993; 
Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011). Primary responsibility for dealing with the impacts and 
needs related to a disaster lies at the local level. At the local level, local governments are 
responsible for addressing many of these impacts and needs (Alesch, Arendt, & Holly, 
2008; Klindt, 2010; Ward & Wamsley, 2007). 
Only when a local government jurisdiction becomes overwhelmed and unable to 
address the situation alone may it request assistance from the state (Smith, 2012; Sylves, 
2008). In these situations, state government provides the resources it has available to 
local jurisdictions. If state resources are also overwhelmed, the state may request an 
emergency or disaster declaration from the President of the United States (Sylves, 2008). 
The President can decide to turn down the application for assistance or approve an 
emergency or disaster declaration (Sylves, 2008). Relative to the number of requests for 
presidential emergency and disaster declarations, very few are approved (Phillips, 2009; 
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Smith, 2011; Sylves, 2008). After the vast majority of disasters, local communities must 
address disaster-related needs as best they can with the help of their state government and 
any willing and able outside NPOs and businesses (Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011). 
Receipt of an emergency or disaster declaration does not allow state and local 
governments to access unlimited assistance. Declarations are granted to states and the 
impacted local governments may or may not be included (Sylves, 2008). Thus, while 
declarations are sometimes made, one or more impacted jurisdictions within the state 
may not be eligible for the assistance that comes with the declaration (Sylves, 2008). 
Additionally, when a declaration is granted, it stipulates the kind and amount of 
assistance that state and eligible local government jurisdictions may access (Sylves, 
2008).  
There are two categories of assistance the federal government provides— 
Public Assistance and Individual Assistance—and one or both may be available 
depending on the declaration (Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011; Sylves, 2008). The few 
disaster declarations that are granted typically make only Public Assistance available 
(Freemont-Smith, Boris, & Steuerle, 2006; Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011; Sylves, 2008). 
The majority of declarations allow state and eligible local governments to access 
financial support only for debris removal, emergency protective measures, repairs to 
roads and bridges, repairs to water control facilities, repairs to government buildings and 
equipment, repairs to government-owned/operated utilities, and/or government parks and 
recreational facilities (FEMA, 2012). Thus, most federal assistance is geared toward 
addressing the political and built systems as opposed to the environmental, social, and 
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economic systems and meeting the needs of government (or the community as a whole), 
as opposed to the needs of impacted individuals and households, businesses, or NPOs. 
When Individual Assistance is made available, eligible individuals and 
households in impacted jurisdictions can apply for, and may receive, low interest loans 
from the Small Business Administration, unemployment assistance, crisis counseling 
services, legal services, and financial assistance for home repair, temporary 
housing/rental assistance, and replacement of essential personal property (FEMA, 2013). 
Yet, even when individuals and households are able to access these types of federal 
assistance, there are limits to the amount of assistance actually provided. For instance, 
temporary housing assistance is limited to only 18 months; and, the maximum amount 
available for repair, replacement, and construction of primary residences usually hovers 
around $30,000 (FEMA, 2013). Furthermore, a range of immediate needs that individuals 
and households commonly have after disaster are not addressed by Individual Assistance 
including clothing, food, sanitary items, pet supplies, and emergency shelter (FEMA, 
2013). A host of long range needs are also not addressed through Individual Assistance 
(Cherry & Cheery, 1997; McDonnell et al. 1995; Morrow, 2000; Phillips, 2009; Zarkour 
& Harrell, 2003). 
When Individual Assistance is made available, the range and amount of assistance 
available to individuals and households is often grossly inadequate to meeting the needs 
of most individuals and households (Cherry & Cheery, 1997; McDonnell et al., 1995; 
Morrow, 2000; Phillips, 2009; Zarkour & Harrell, 2003). Moreover, the aid available is 
often not accessible to those individuals and households who need it most for a variety of 
reasons (e.g., they cannot find the paperwork that proves they are eligible, they do not 
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speak/read/write in English, they are not citizens, they are not aware that aid is available, 
etc.) (Bolin & Stanford, 1991, 1998; Cherry & Cherry, 1997; Finch, Emrich, & Cutter, 
2010; Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004). And, Individual Assistance has been criticized 
for being fragmented, inflexible, and poorly timed (see for example: Cherry & Cherry, 
1997; Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004; Liu, 2010; Norris-Tirrell & Clay, 2006; Smith, 
2011; Waugh & Hy, 1990).  
Although there is certainly room for improvement in Individual Assistance, some 
of the federal government’s apparent neglect can be explained. First, federal assistance is 
not designed to make disaster-impacted communities whole again. The aid available is 
supposed to be supplementary to state and local resources and private assistance (Egan & 
Tischler, 2010; Smith, 2012; Sylves, 2008). Second, government takes a utilitarian, 
populations-based approach to disaster assistance (Egan & Tischler, 2010; Smith, 2012; 
Sylves, 2008). It focusses its resources on addressing those impacts and needs that will 
benefit communities as a whole as opposed to the needs of specific individuals and 
households within impacted communities. Third, the type and amount of aid that is 
available and the process by which it is accessed and distributed is dictated by a complex 
network of law, regulation, and policy (Egan & Tischler, 2010; Smith, 2012; Sylves, 
2008). For these reasons, the federal government may be able to incrementally improve 
Individual Assistance, but under current law, it will not be able to meet all of the needs of 
impacted individual and households after disasters.  
Thus, there is a significant need for help from NPOs given the context of disaster 
assistance in the United States particularly as relates to individuals and households. NPOs 
are needed in the immediate aftermath of disasters to provide individuals and households 
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food, shelter, clothing, and other basic necessities because these needs are not commonly 
addressed by local governments and are not addressed by the federal government even 
when a disaster declaration is granted. Because disaster declarations are relatively rare, 
NPOs are often the only providers of assistance to individuals and households for their 
longer term needs (e.g., financial support, temporary housing, replacement of personal 
property, psychological support services, manpower and expertise for debris removal, 
repair, and reconstruction of damaged and destroyed homes, etc.). And, when disaster 
declarations are provided that include Individual Assistance, many individuals and 
households are still reliant on NPO services because they are not able to access 
assistance, or, if they are able to, they may not be able to access enough to meet their 
needs (Egan & Tischler, 2010; Kapucu, 2003, 2007; Pipa, 2006). NPOs are increasingly 
counted on by government to address the needs of individuals and households after 
disaster (Egan & Tischler, 2010; Kapucu, 2003, 2007, Kapucu, Yuldashev, & Feldheim, 
2011).   
In addition to meeting individual and household needs directly, NPOs often 
coordinate donations management, volunteer management, and engage in advocacy 
related to meeting the needs of vulnerable populations (Chandra & Acosta, 2006; Phillips 
& Jenkins, 2008; Phillips, 2009; Pipa, 2006). NPOs also address another gap that tends to 
left by government after disasters—a gap related to natural, historical, and cultural 
resources. NPOs often engage in advocacy related to protecting and/or restoring 
environmental, historical, and/or cultural resources after disaster and/or promote projects 
to help these kinds of resources recover (Al Nammari, 2008; Phillips, 2009; Spenneman 
& Graham, 2007).  
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NPOs are needed for many reasons after disaster; and, historically many NPOs 
are willing to assist communities after disasters strike. Yet, NPO efforts are often 
uncoordinated and result in untimely assistance, duplication of services, and wasted 
resources. It would be beneficial for these organizations to coordinate amongst 
themselves and with local government given the important role that they play in 
community response and recovery. LVOADs are a potential way for NPOs to coordinate 
at the local level; and, thus, it is important that we learn more about these organizations 
and how they are created and maintained. 
The Nature of Nonprofits and Coordination Challenges 
The need for nonprofit (NPO) involvement after disasters is great as is the need 
for coordination amongst them. Creation and maintenance of Local Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOADs) in local communities may increase the 
likelihood that the assistance that nonprofits render after disasters meets the needs of 
impacted communities effectively and efficiently. Yet, due to the nature of NPOs, 
coordination will always be difficult whether or not an LVOAD exists. Specific aspects 
of NPOs that make coordination amongst them difficult include NPO mission, 
constituencies, organizational structure, and capacity. 
Organizational missions are important structural features of NPOs. NPO missions 
identify for whom or what cause the organization exists to serve (Wolf, 1999). NPOs may 
have missions oriented to broad issues such as education, physical fitness, or mental 
health (Eisner, 2010; Spillan & Crandall, 2002); and/or their missions may be oriented to 
specific groups such as children, single mothers, low income individuals, prisoners, 
elderly, the mentally ill, physically disabled, or others (Eisner, 2010; Klindt, 2010; Pipa, 
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2006; Smith, 2012). Organizational missions also drive what NPOs do, that is, their 
programs, services, and activities (Wolf, 1999).  
During disasters, NPO involvement is often an extension of their organizational 
mission. Thus, many NPOs want to, and become, involved after disasters, but they want 
their involvement to serve their organizational mission. Many NPO missions differ 
significantly one to the next; and, as a result, so to do their reasons for being involved. 
This situation makes coordination among them difficult. And, among those organizations 
that have similar missions (i.e., are involved in the same issue area or target the same 
group/issue), there is sometimes competition to provide services. After disaster, this may 
result in overlap or redundancy in the services each provides (Sylves, 2009). Thus, while 
the variation in NPO missions makes coordination desirable it also makes it challenging.  
NPOs are also concerned about the constituencies their organization serves and 
those with whom their organization interacts (Wolf, 1999). NPOs strive constantly to 
demonstrate their commitment to their various constituencies and meet their needs and 
interests (Ott, 2001; Wolf, 1999). These constituencies include the organization’s board 
of directors, service recipients, any affiliated volunteers, donors and grantors, and the 
public in the communities they serve (Wolf, 1999). Due to the intimate and responsive 
relationship NPOs have with their constituencies, one can expect that NPO involvement 
in disasters will be heavily influenced by constituents and what they think/want at any 
given time including when the NPO becomes involved, how long it stays involved, what 
organizations it interacts with when it is involved, and what it does when it is involved. 
Constituency influence can make NPOs somewhat unpredictable in the aftermath of 
disasters and pose a challenge to coordination. 
	   22 
The varying structure of NPOs poses yet another challenge to coordination in the 
aftermath of disasters. There are a variety of types of NPOs including local, community-
based organizations, so-called voluntary agencies whose staff are primarily volunteers, 
faith-based organizations (e.g., churches), and regional or national NPOs with local 
chapters spread across the country (Eisner, 2010; Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011). Each of 
these types of NPOs has a different organizational structure and there are differences in 
structure among NPOs of each type. Yet, while they are different in organizational 
structure they are similar in their leadership structure. NPO leadership structure tends to 
be decentralized and egalitarian (Coppola, 2007; Ott, 2001). Unlike other kinds of 
organizations, nonprofits lack “neat, hierarchical positions or slots” (Ott, 2001, p. 24). 
Coordination requires some level of familiarity with the structures of the organizations 
involved, but when the structures vary so significantly from organization-to-organization 
this familiarity is difficult to achieve.  
The capacity of nonprofits to assist impacted communities after disaster varies 
significantly. Nonprofits vary in the size of their staff—some have only one or a few 
employees and some have hundreds (Eisner, 2010; Klindt, 2010; Spillan, & Crandall, 
2002). They also vary in the source of their staff—some rely primarily on paid 
professional staff and some rely primarily on volunteers to fulfill their mission (ASPE, 
2008; Block, 2001; Klindt, 2010; Phillips, 2009; Salamon, 2001; Smith, 2011). Within 
those organizations that depend on volunteers, there exists variation in the volunteers 
themselves with respect to their involvement in the organization (e.g., daily basis, 
periodic, infrequent) as well as their skills, abilities, and experience (Block, 2001; 
Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011). All of this variation in nonprofit capacity that exists on a 
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day-to-day basis carries over into disaster times and makes coordination hard to 
accomplish. 
While the aforementioned aspects of capacity are important to understanding 
coordination challenges among nonprofits, variation in funding is perhaps the most 
significant barrier to coordination. NPOs do not make an economic profit and the goods 
and services they provide are typically free or associated with only a minimal charge to 
cover expenses (Boris & Steuerle, 2006; Eisner, 2010; Ott, 2001; Popkin, 1978; Salamon, 
2001; Sylves, 2008). Most nonprofits rely upon a combination of sources of funding 
including donations, grants, contracts, and fee-for-services to fulfill their mission; and, 
the sources of funding and the amounts received fluctuate (Block, 2001; Coppola, 2007; 
Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011; Sylves, 2008). As the amount of funding available to an 
organization varies so too does the quality and number of facilities, equipment, supplies, 
and other resources available to them to fulfill their mission. As a consequence, 
nonprofits have both unstable financial and resource foundations (Coppola, 2007) and 
have to spend considerable time, day-to-day, trying to attract funding through generating 
positive publicity and fundraising (Coppola, 2007). Unfortunately, nonprofits often 
compete with one another in routine times for both publicity and funding (Coppola, 
2007).  
During disaster relief efforts, funding continues to be a fundamental concern for 
nonprofits (Chandra & Acosta, 2009; Egan & Tischler, 2010; Fremont-Smith, Boris, & 
Steuerle, 2006; Pipa, 2006). They need funding to continue to provide their normal 
services as well as additional funding to help meet disaster-related needs and they depend 
on publicity and engaged donors to be able to generate the necessary funds (Chandra & 
	   24 
Acosta, 2009; Egan & Tischler, 2010; Fremont-Smith, Boris, & Steuerle, 2006; Pipa, 
2006). Nonprofits often perceive collective, coordinated efforts to limit their ability to get 
funding (Sylves, 2008). 
LVOADs provide a valuable resource for NPOs, as they can act as a central hub 
for coordinating, and, hence, maximizing, their efforts. Yet, due to their nature, such 
coordination is difficult. Review of the literature would suggest that when and where 
LVOADs are created and maintained, it is against all odds. Given LVOADs potential, it 
is important that we understand the factors that drive the creation and maintenance of 
these organizations so that we can overcome the challenges inherent in attempts to bring 
about coordination among these organizations after disaster.  
Conclusion 
All of the issues discussed thus far point to the need for coordination of all groups 
involved in disaster operations, yet, it is only recently that groups such as LVOAD have 
begun to surface and establish themselves within their respective communities. They 
have the potential to help nonprofit organizations (NPOs) maximize their contributions 
after disasters. This study begins to address the lack of research on these organizations by 
exploring how they are created and how they are maintained between disasters. The 
chapter to follow discusses the methods this study employed. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 	  
Chapter Three is comprised of five sections. The first section describes the 
methodological approach for this study. The second section discusses the population and 
sampling procedures. The third section explains the process of data collection. The fourth 
section discusses data analysis. The fifth section discusses the limitations involved with 
this study and the measures that were taken to minimize the impact of the limitations on 
the value of this study.  
Methodological Approach 
There has not been any empirical research related specifically to Local Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOADs) that informed this study. Moreover, there is 
a general lack of empirical research on nonprofit organization (NPO) engagement in 
disasters. Since no appropriate theoretical foundation existed upon which to build a 
quantitative approach to this research topic, it was necessary to take a qualitative 
approach (Charmaz, 2006; Maxwell, 2005; Snape & Spencer, 2003). In searching for a 
methodological approach to anchor this study, grounded theory was chosen because it 
provided the tools to best explore the research questions for this study, while ensuring 
that the standards expected of scholarly research were met (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 
1978).  
Grounded theory was founded by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and has been added 
to and expanded upon in several works since its establishment (Glaser, 1978, 1995; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2006). Building upon the aforementioned works, 
Charmaz (2006) offers a definition of grounded theory when she states, “grounded theory 
is a method of conducting qualitative research that focuses on creating conceptual 
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farmeworks or theories through building inductive analysis from the data. Hence, the 
analytic categories are directly ‘grounded’ in the data” (p. 187). Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) explain grounded theory as, “theory that was derived from data, systematically 
gathered and analyzed through the research process” (p. 12). This idea is supported by 
Charmaz (2006) who states, “the method favors analysis over description, fresh 
categories over preconceived ideas and extant theories, and systematically focused 
sequential data collection over large initial samples” (p. 187). The grounded theory 
approach makes many analyticial tools available to researchers to explore their data. 
Concientious use of these tools ensures that analysis is rigourous and that the findings of 
the research are grounded in the data. The grounded theory approach was ideal for 
studying LVOADs since there is so little known about how they are created or 
maintained.  
Grounded theorists recognize that the researcher is part of the research process, 
and therefore, that the researcher should be aware of their part in the research process 
(Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1978; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This recognition is a strength of 
the method because it forces the researcher to recognize their biases throughout data 
collection and analysis. This aspect of grounded theory encourages the researcher to 
proceed with an open mind and recognize those instances where preconceived thoughts 
and ideas may be influencing their research. This was of particular importance for this 
study, since the purpose was exploration and the introduction of fresh categories. 
Perhaps the most important influence that led to the decision to pursue grounded 
theory was the basic premise that theory needs to be grounded in the data (Charmaz, 
2006; Straus & Corbin, 1998; Glaser & Straus, 1967; Glaser, 1978). The research is of no 
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value if it is not grounded in the data, and worse yet, misinterpreted or skewed data can 
actually be dangerous if it is contributing unfounded concepts or theory. Therefore, 
grounded theory was ideal for studying LVOADs since they had not previously been 
empirically researched; it met the rigorous standards of scholarly research; and could lead 
to fresh categories that are grounded in the data. Further discussion of the grounded 
methodology employed in this study follows in the data collection and data analysis 
sections. 
Data Collection 
 Data was conducted through semi-structured, in-depth interviews. Potential 
participants were asked to complete a face-to-face interview at a date, time, and location 
that were convenient for them. Participants were given the option to do a telephone 
interview if it was more convenient. Follow-up phone calls or emails were used for 
verification or clarification of lingering questions or issues discovered during the 
transcription and analytic processes. 
 The interviews were conducted in keeping with Charmaz’s (2006) guidelines for 
“intensive interviewing”. Charmaz (2006) views interviews as “directed conversations” 
where interviewers guide conversation related to their topic by asking only a few main 
questions and supplement the main questions they ask with the use of probes and follow-
up questions (p. 25-27). During the interviews, participants were asked open-ended 
questions about their history with their organization, how the LVOAD developed, and 
how the Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOAD) is maintained. See 
Appendix A for a list of the initial open-ended questions and Appendix B for a list of 
potential follow-up questions and probes. Questions were not designed to lead 
	   28 
participants to disclose personal information. Other than the name and organization the 
participant represents, personal information was not collected nor was such information 
part of data analysis. Names and organizational information was collected for tracking 
purposes only. During transcription and coding, codes were used in place of identifying 
information to protect the confidentiality of participants. Data analysis focused on the 
responses themselves, rather than on the individuals and organizations providing the 
remarks. 
This study employed precautionary measures to ensure the confidentiality of the 
interview participants. For instance, while the interviews were voice recorded, the voice 
recordings were deleted upon transcription and the only personal information that was 
collected and maintained for the duration of the study is the name of the participant and 
the organization he/she represented. While utilized to link the interview to a participant, 
the names and organizations were not used in any reports of the study's findings and the 
records and transcripts were destroyed upon conclusion of the research. The information 
obtained for this study was not of a personal nature or intended to explore research 
questions related to the participants themselves, but rather organizations in the form of 
LVOADs. Nevertheless, there should not be any negative consequence to participants 
should their participation in this study be discovered. Thus, the risk associated with this 
study is no greater than one would encounter in any number of situations in daily life. 
Population and Sampling 
 The population for this study consisted of representatives from nonprofit and 
governmental organizations within communities developing a Local Voluntary 
Organization Active in Disaster (LVOAD) within FEMA’s Region VIII (i.e. CO, MT, 
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ND, SD, UT, WY). Convenience sampling was used to narrow the population for the 
study to a reasonable sample frame. Convenience sampling involves targeting individuals 
for participation based on the researchers ability to “access and easily collect data” from 
them (Creswell, 2007). Convenience sampling was appropriate for this study for two 
primary reasons. First, there is no centralized directory with contact information for the 
various LVOAD members from which to develop a sample. A simple Internet search 
using “LVOAD,” “Local VOAD,” and “COAD” as keywords does not yield any useful 
information or contact information for any actual LVOADs. Second, the desire to 
conduct face-to-face interviews required that the researcher be located in close proximity 
to research participants. Since the researcher knew from his involvement in the 
Department of Emergency Management at North Dakota State University (NDSU) that 
there were LVOADs located in the Midwest, it was convenient to narrow the sample 
frame to individuals associated with these organizations.  
 Snowball sampling was used to further develop this study’s sample. The snowball 
sampling technique involves the researcher identifying one or more individuals with 
knowledge relevant to a study for participation and asking them to refer the researcher to 
additional individuals who may have information integral to the study’s research question 
(Taylor & Bodgan, 1998). The researcher met several LVOAD members through his 
attendance of a LVOAD meeting in the Midwest and through an emergency management 
departmental presentation by the founder of a LVOAD. The individuals met through 
these events became the first potential participants for this study; and, it was anticipated 
that, once interviewed, they would be able to recommend other individuals who would be 
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able to provide insight into this study’s research topic as well as the contact information 
for those individuals.  
Potential participants were initially contacted via email and invited to participate 
in the study. Please see Appendix C for the invitation email for this study. An 
information sheet about the study was emailed to potential participants as an attachment 
to the invitation email. The email invitation referenced the information sheet and 
encouraged potential participants to review the information provided. The information 
sheet was also reviewed at the start of interviews with those who opted to participate. 
Please see Appendix D for the information sheet for this study.  
 It was anticipated that the use of convenience and snowball sampling would result 
in a sample of approximately twenty-four individuals. This number was merely an initial 
and somewhat arbitrary estimation. In qualitative research, it is more important that each 
individual who participates is able to provide rich, detailed data, specific to the topic 
under study, than it is that some total number of interviews are completed (Creswell, 
2007). Ultimately, the sampling techniques resulted in the participation of 15 individuals. 
Approximately 15 other individuals were contacted, but for a variety of reasons, chose 
not to participate.  
Because this study is using a grounded theory approach, the concept of theoretical 
saturation was very important in determining how many actual interviews were 
completed. Theoretical saturation is when the ongoing process of interviews and data 
analysis lead to the discovery of “no new properties, dimensions, or relationships” 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 143) or “the point where collecting additional data seems 
counterproductive; the ‘new’ that is uncovered does not add that much more to 
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explanation” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 136). As the 15 interviews were completed and 
analysis was undertaken, it was felt that theoretical saturation was not yet achieved, so 
the sample frame was widened to include other LVOADs. Since the first four LVOADs 
in this study operated largely within FEMA Region VIII, it seemed logical to recruit 
more participants within FEMA Region VIII in hopes that theoretical saturation would be 
realized. 
A great deal of time and energy was expended contacting state VOAD 
representatives, state offices of emergency management, and several other government 
and nonprofit organizations within FEMA’s Region VIII inquiring into the existence of 
possible LVOADs within their states. Dozens of email messages, telephone 
conversations, and follow-up conversations uncovered only one additional LVOAD 
operating within FEMA’s Region VIII, beyond the four that were already involved in this 
study, which resulted in 2 more interviews. These two interviews did not reveal any new 
themes or add anything new to the preexisting data from the other four LVOADs, but 
they did serve to strengthen the categories surrounding the creation of an LVOAD that 
had been uncovered in the previous interviews. After all interviews were concluded, there 
were a total of (N=17) interviews. The four initial LVOADs were from one state and the 
fifth LVOAD was from a second state. The LVOADs represented in this study include all 
of the LVOADs operating within FEMA’s Region VIII. The participants included 
individuals from both government and nonprofit. There were six participants interviewed 
from governmental positions that were engaged with the LVOADs to varying degrees. 
There were eleven participants from the nonprofit community. Most of the individuals 
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from the nonprofit community assumed leadership positions at some point in time within 
their respective LVOADs.  
There was consensus across the five communities that developing an 
organizational structure was the moment they became official LVOADs. This topic will 
be discussed in greater detail later on in Chapter 4 in the section titled LVOAD 
Organizational Structure. Of the five LVOAD entities that were involved in this study, 
two considered themselves to be official LVOADs, one was in the process of becoming 
official, and two did not consider themselves to have reached official status. Because only 
two of the LVOADs reached official status, there was limited data to explore the second 
research question – What facilitates and hinders the maintenance of LVOADs?. Although 
the data has limitations, the rigid process of data analysis involving line-by-line coding, 
focused coding, in vivo coding, memo writing, and concept mapping resulted in 
saturation of the data for both research questions. 
The LVOADs that became official shared a similar composition and resembled 
the State and National VOADs. One LVOAD had a board that consisted of a chair, vice 
chair, secretary, and treasurer. In addition, it had 2 members-at-large representing each 
county. The only notable difference with the other official LVOAD was that they did not 
have a chair, but instead had two co-chairs sharing the leadership responsibilities. The 
LVOAD that was in the process of becoming official was adopting the same format of 
chair, vice-chair, and so forth. The two LVOAD groups that did not become official did 
not have a formal structure.  
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Data Analysis 
Charmaz (2006) articulates 3 stages of coding using the grounded theory 
approach including 1) intial coding, 2) focussed coding, and 3) theoretical coding. Upon 
completion of the transcription process, the initial four interviews were coded using line-
by-line coding. In addition to the identification of gaps in the data, line-by-line coding 
also enables the researcher to break up the data into components and sub-components 
(Charmaz, 2006). In conjuntion with initial coding, the data was coded in vivo to capture 
the special meanings and languge used by the interviewees (Charmaz, 2006). Although a 
researcher may be familiar with the language and lingo of a given community, it was 
anticipated that Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOADs) and related 
organizations have certain words and phrases that will require coding apart from the 
generic meanings of the word/phrases. After the initial coding process, focused coding 
was undertaken, which involved abstracting the most significant or frequent codes or 
categories identified in the initial coding process (Charmaz, 2006). Focused coding 
requires that each initial code be given wieght or significance by categorizing them 
according to how they fit with the study’s research questions (Charmaz, 2006).  
At this point, a decision was made to continue into the next stage of theoretical 
coding, since the analysis uncovered results that were not evident in existing disaster 
theory. This finding was not surprising since there has not been any research into 
LVOADs and there are no other entities that function quite like a LVOAD. Theoretical 
coding follows focused coding and explores possible relationships between and across 
the categories uncovered in focused coding (Charmaz, 2006). Therefore, theoretical 
coding can lead to the formation of hypotheses between and across relationships of 
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categories (Charmaz, 2006). The continual and cyclical nature of the coding process is 
one of the strengths of grounded theory. 
In addition to coding, the grounded theory approach allows researchers to make 
use of a variety of other analytical tools including memos, diagrams, and concept maps 
(Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1978). These tools faciltitate greater depth of analysis 
throughout the data collection and data analysis processes (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). For example, diagrams and concept maps may reveal connections or 
relationships between codes that would otherwise be missed and memos capture data and 
considerations that would otherwise be forgotten. The grounded theory approach to data 
analysis assumes that analysis takes place at each stage of data collection and analysis 
(i.e., during and after interviews, transcriptions, initial coding, theoretical coding, and 
again, in recoding, as new categories and themes emerge in subsequent interviews, 
transcriptions, and coding); thus, these tools were used before, during, and after the 
coding processes previously discussed (Charmaz, 2006). Memo’s, diagrams, and concept 
maps proved to be an integral part of the analytical process and essential to understanding 
the data and how the factors fit together. At the conclusion of the study, nearly 13 hours 
of audio were transcribed, coded, and recoded. Interviews averaged just over forty-five 
minutes in length.  
Limitations 
The ultimate goal of this study is to offer findings grounded in rigourous and 
appropriate use of the grounded theory approach. Following in the footsteps of Glaser 
(1978), Charmaz (2006) suggests that the hallmarks of a high quality grounded theory 
study include credibility of the data collection and anlaysis process, originality of the 
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categories and concepts, resonance of the topic, and usefullness of the research (p. 182-
183). These tenets of grounded theory were a continual guiding force throughout data 
collection and analysis and the results will show that original concepts and categories 
were uncovered that will be valuable to the academic discipline of emergency 
management, the profession, and all of those involved with the function of emergency 
management.  
Nevertheless, this study, like any other, has limitations. There are four limitations 
that are particularly important to note. Firstly, the convenience and snowball sampling 
techniques used in data collection prohibit the generalization of the study’s findings. 
Secondly, use of the snowball sampling technique, specifically, may result in data that is 
not only un-generalizable, but also biased due to the potential for study participants to 
refer the researcher to other potential study participants on the basis of their like-
mindedness, as opposed to their general ability to contribute meaningfully to the study’s 
research topic (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Thirdly, the lack of participation that has been 
previously noted adds to the previous limitation noted with snowball sampling. There 
were a number of participants that initially agreed to participate and later dropped out of 
the research prior to being interviewed for various reasons. These individuals 
undoubtedly offered an important perspective on the creation and maintenance of 
LVOADs that was never shared.  
Lastly, the researcher’s own experience may be a limitation to this study. The 
researcher has attended Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOAD) 
general meetings, attended LVOAD board meetings, and acted as an intern for a 
LVOAD. In the process, the researcher developed ideas related to the research questions. 
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It is possible that his experience could have led to a bias in how the data was analyzed. 
McCallin (2003) stated that the “researcher must be willing to put aside or to critically 
examine preconceived ideas, to try to understand actions and interactions in a particular 
context from the point of view of the people involved” (p. 204). The analytical tools 
associated with the grounded theory approach lead researchers to return to the data time 
and again questioning their findings and what those findings mean; and, through the 
conscientious use of these tools, the potential for this bias should be minimized. The 
principles of grounded theory were rigorously followed throughout the entire research 
process and a conscious effort was taken to recognize and acknowledge limitations every 
step of the way. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical principles of grounded theory and why it 
was chosen as the appropriate approach to study Local Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster (LVOADs). The data collection and data analysis procedures were identified and 
explained in detail. Concerns related to the quality of the study and possible limtiations 
were discussed. It is believed that by following the principles of and using the tools of 
grounded theory, throughout interviewing, transcribing, intitial coding, coding, and 
recoding, this study has produced findings grounded in rich data. The results of this data 
are presented in the next two chapters. Chapter 4 discusses the factors that facilitated the 
creation of a LVOAD and Chapter 5 presents the factors that affected the maintenance of 
LVOADs. Chapter 6 interprets the significance of these findings.  	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CHAPTER 4: LVOAD CREATION 	  
This chapter discusses the findings regarding the first research question: What 
facilitates the creation of a Local Volunteer Organization Active in Disaster (LVOAD)? 
The data uncovered a number of factors significant to the creation of a LVOAD. These 
factors cluster into three central categories. The three categories appeared to follow a 
progressive order of stages, although the factors within each category did not necessarily 
follow a specific sequence. The presence of one or more hazard events was the first major 
factor that facilitated the creation of a LVOAD as evidenced by all (N=17) of the 
interviews. Leadership was the second major factor to drive LVOAD creation and 
seemed to emerge post-hazard event(s). The third major factor is the development of an 
organizational structure. These factors are discussed in the first three sections of this 
chapter. In addition to the pressures that push VOADs to form, there are also counter 
pressures that threaten LVOAD creation. The final section in this chapter examines some 
of these barriers that originate as a LVOAD develops and carry on throughout the life of 
the organization. 
Hazard Event/Hazard Events 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental factor to influence the creation of a LVOAD in 
each of the five communities explored in this study was the presence of a hazard event(s). 
Specifically, flood-related hazard event(s) led to the creation of all five LVOADs 
represented in this study. This section discusses the three factors within the hazard 
event(s) category. These three factors are 1) hazard threat, 2) problems in organizational 
response, and 3) needs/unmet needs. Although there are any number of factors that pop 
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up in the aftermath of a hazard event, these three factors seemed to encompass those that 
led the LVOADs in this study to develop.  
Hazard Threat 
 The first factor discussed is the threat of a hazard event. In each of the five cases, 
flooding appeared to be the initial factor that stimulated community discussions on 
starting a LVOAD. While flooding was the hazard in each case, flooding impacted each 
community differently. These differences can be attributed to characteristics of each 
community, as well as characteristics of the flooding itself. The five communities varied 
in geographic size, population, flood history, and composition (e.g. types of 
governmental and non-governmental organizations involved). Among the five 
communities, there were three different types of flooding observed including riverine, 
lake, and overland flooding. The impact of the flooding across the five communities also 
varied in size, magnitude, frequency, and speed of onset. Of the differences noted, the 
frequency of hazard impact appeared to have the greatest influence on the creation of a 
LVOAD. In two of the communities, a single hazard event impact was noted as the key 
factor that directly initiated community discussions on forming a LVOAD. One 
participant stated, “It prompted because of how the flooding started; basically it was just 
that we were flooding...” It was also noted that the flood event was essential to the 
creation of a LVOAD. The following statement provides evidence to support this claim: 
“Prior to that flood, to get them to any type of meeting, to get this group together was 
next to impossible. The minute the flood happened, that room was full.” This next 
statement provides further evidence and demonstrates how the flooding led to a group 
forming in the following statement: “When we were having all the flooding in [Year X], 
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it just became apparent that we needed coordination to make sure that we were best 
serving our public, so we put together a group.” This next statement underlines the 
significance of hazard event frequency on LVOAD creation: 
[Community E] had not been hit in ages. This was the first big one that they 
needed help with and they needed to get help to individuals. So, having not been 
hit by a disaster before, they really didn’t know what they were going to be 
needing. 
 Although flooding served as the antecedent in each of the five communities and 
ultimately led to discussions of a LVOAD group forming, a single hazard event alone 
was not enough to nurture community interest in creating a LVOAD. The two 
communities that only experienced one hazard event did not go on to develop into official 
LVOADs. The two communities that eventually did become official LVOADs 
experienced multiple years of flooding. The community that was in the stages of making 
their LVOAD official had recently experienced a second season of flooding. This 
suggests hazard event frequency is a major factor with LVOAD creation. One participant 
stated, “It was the consistent flooding and also the previous year [referring to the flooding 
of the previous year]...” Another participant noted, “I don’t remember if we started in 
[Year X] or thereabouts, but, what happened is that we were in another spring of disaster 
and the State VOAD held a meeting here in [Community B].” 
Although the conversation thus far suggests that higher frequency of flooding 
positively influences the creation of a LVOAD, there is also evidence to suggest the 
contrary. In one community the repetitive flooding had another effect altogether and 
actually impeded and delayed the formation of the LVOAD. The following quote 
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exemplifies the negative affect that multiple flood events had on the formation of the 
LVOAD in Community A: 
…we went through this period of three years straight with major floods and just 
never had time to sit down and really do this. Until after [Year X]. And, then we 
said, you know it's time to do this. We just can't wait for a break to do it. 
Although the presence of one or more hazard events was clearly a factor leading 
to LVOAD formation, there is also an element of forethought involved. In all of these 
communities, the hazard event(s) alone may have been enough to spur LVOAD 
discussions. However, the anticipation of a future hazard event also played a role in the 
decision to form a LVOAD. In the two communities that did not become official 
LVOADs, the participants did not seem overly concerned or threatened by the likelihood 
of future flooding. These two communities seemed to perceive the flood as a singular 
event. In the other three communities, more than one flood event occurred. The data 
suggests community members perceived a greater future threat of hazard events and their 
perceptions of flood risk were a factor in their decisions to pursue a LVOAD. This next 
quote describes how the LVOAD got started as a result of the combination of a series of 
hazard events and the threat of future hazard events: 
And that was at the post flooding time of [Year X], where it became more active 
on ‘well you know we've done this, it's looking like what the other people are 
telling us we're going to be doing this again down the way, so maybe we should 
be a little more settled as volunteers too.’ And so there was a small group that got 
together. 
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It is clear a single hazard event has the power to spur interest in creating a 
LVOAD. The evidence uncovered in the five communities in this study suggests that a 
single event may not be enough to lead communities to adopt official LVOADs. This 
study shows that two or more hazard events were necessary for a LVOAD to become 
official. Therefore, hazard events may be a better determining factor for LVOAD 
creation. In the five communities, the flooding left communities with some degree of 
unmet needs, which are discussed in the following section. 
Needs/Unmet Needs 
 As previously discussed, unmet needs are needs that emerge following a hazard 
event that the recovery system in the United States is not currently designed, or able, to 
address. There are two general types of needs that surface following a hazard event. 
These needs can be classified as either hazard-generated or response-generated needs 
(Quarentelli, 1988). It is imperative to note that it is not the LVOAD’s role to directly 
address unmet needs. Although the individuals/households are being served by individual 
organizations that comprise the LVOAD, the LVOAD itself does not directly attend to 
the needs. As one participant put it, “[The LVOAD] is not an action group, it’s a network 
group.” Therefore, the LVOAD does not address the unmet needs, but coordinates 
services across the nonprofit and government organizations to best serve the community. 
This coordination and networking alludes to the other type of needs, which are response-
generated needs.  
Response-generated needs arise to address issues with communication, 
coordination, collaboration, and cooperation across the organizations involved with 
community response and recovery following a hazard event (Auf de Heide1989). Both 
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types of needs were discussed as influential in the creation of a LVOAD. As one might 
expect, this study revealed a direct relationship between hazard-generated and response-
generated needs. In the five communities examined, the communities that noted having 
more hazard-generated needs also reported greater demand for response-generated needs. 
There were a number of needs revealed in the interviews. This study does not 
intend to compile an exhaustive list of all of the needs that surface in the aftermath of a 
disaster. Although there were some minor differences, the five communities shared very 
similar needs, which is not surprising given all five communities experienced flooding. 
The most often cited hazard-generated need in all five communities stemmed from 
damage to individual/household dwellings. Although there was a high degree of variance 
regarding the amount of damage to dwellings across the five communities, the needs 
presented by the damages remained similar.  
Each of the five communities addressed the individual/household needs in a like 
manner. In response to the hazard event(s), various nonprofit and government 
organizations within the communities got together and reached out to 
individuals/households to identify what the needs were. There was a large degree of 
variance across the five communities as to what organizations were involved in the 
community meetings and the ratio between nonprofit and government organizations was 
different in each community. Nevertheless, the needs were assessed in a similar manner. 
The process of how these needs were initially identified is described in the following 
excerpt: 
…people would come in, we would identify what their need was. I need food. I 
need food stamps. I need to replace my food stamps. I need cleanup supplies. I 
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need somebody to muck my house out. I need… Whatever their needs were. And 
we tried to then send them to the specific table for the organization or the 
agency/department that would be able to address their needs. 
One participant described this process as identifying the “3 M’s – money, 
materials, and manpower.” As the quotation highlights, once the LVOAD identified the 
needs, it would “send them” to the specific organization that handles the need they are 
presenting. The process illustrated in this quote demonstrates the basic relationship 
between hazard-generated needs and response-generated needs. The food, food stamps, 
and cleanup supplies are the hazard-generated needs. The coordination between and 
across the organizations to meet those needs represents the response-generated needs. 
Understanding this basic relationship between hazard- and response-generated needs is 
essential to understanding how needs/unmet needs influenced the creation of the 
LVOADs in this study. 
Although there are a number of needs that arise in the aftermath of a hazard event, 
the following discussion focuses on the needs that were most commonly referenced in the 
interviews. In all cases, the majority of the flood damages to dwellings were treated by a 
method referred to as “muck-out,” which is the process of tearing out flooring and walls 
that were exposed to flood waters and contain dangerous mold and mildew. The most 
common muck-out material that was referenced in the interviews was cleanup buckets. 
Cleanup buckets were filled with equipment such as protective gloves, masks, mops, 
bleach, garbage bags, and other cleanup supplies designed to safely and effectively 
“muck-out” a damaged dwelling. The following quote demonstrates the need for cleanup 
buckets: 
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We needed cleanup buckets. Little dumpster buckets that had everything you 
would need to clean up. We gave out a lot of those. I mean I don’t know what the 
total numbers were, but there were a few going out the door every few minutes. 
And maybe that’s what the need was. Maybe that need was served. 
The cleanup buckets were the most popular hazard-generated need cited in all five 
communities. As previously discussed, the hazard-generated needs shared a direct 
relationship with response-generated needs. In each of the five communities, more than 
one organization possessed cleanup buckets, which is described in the following 
statement: “Cleaning supplies were just nuts at one point because they had all the same 
stuff coming in and feeding into three different groups.” Since more than one 
organization were handling cleanup buckets it was beneficial for those organizations to 
coordinate efforts. In addition to offering cleanup supplies, these organizations were also 
responsible for several other tasks and activities, which only added to the need to 
coordinate efforts with other organizations. The following excerpt highlights how one 
organization may be involved in a number of different tasks and activities: 
…we don’t just give out funds, we also find people that can help them with other 
needs, such as mold and mildew, or providing them with furniture, or the 
voluntary types of things, or whatever. At that point in the disaster that’s the types 
of needs that we had. 
Thus far, only one element of needs has been discussed and the data suggests it is 
beneficial for organizations to consolidate their effort to best serve the community. As the 
last quote hinted, a coordinated effort becomes even more important as needs become 
more complex. 
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 In many cases, cleanup buckets were not sufficient to meet the 
individual/household needs. In some cases, the homeowners were physically unable to do 
the work, which is discussed in the following quote: 
They take care of the one piece, the sandbagging. There's a whole other piece, its 
the cleanup and the removing of the sandbags. And the elderly people who cannot 
do that. And the cleanup of basements and yards. Um, and there are a lot of 
people that can't do those kind of things. 
 In others, the individual/household may not possess the skills or training necessary to 
safely and effectively use the cleanup buckets. 
One of the things that we found looking at disasters, especially with the flooding, 
is the cleanup effort. That was really major because the volume of volunteers goes 
down for cleanup. During the crisis, it'll be high and then cleanup the volume 
goes down because it takes some special training, it takes some abilities, you need 
some supplies. 
 In one community, they brought in experts to teach organizations how to effectively 
engage in “muck-out” a damaged house, which is described in the following excerpt: 
They brought in some experts on mold and mildew and how do you do this? How 
do you clean it up?  What exactly do you need?  What works?  What doesn’t 
work?  When is it time to start cutting walls out and get down to the framework of 
the house and all that? 
Considering the muck-out process alone, there are a number of needs that have 
already been brought up including cleanup bucket materials, acquiring the knowledge and 
skill, and possessing the physical ability to do the work. In addition to these basic needs, 
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some individuals were forced to vacate their homes and find new or temporary housing 
while their dwellings were mucked-out. Individuals/households needed money for almost 
anything one can conceive from temporary housing and lost wages to everyday expenses 
such as groceries, gas, and food. Individuals needed a huge range of supplies ranging 
from toiletries to building materials. These are just a few of the needs that were 
mentioned by participants. Once the muck-out process was complete, some households 
had to wait before they could rebuild, if rebuilding was an option. Once the muck-out 
process was complete, a whole new series of needs arose with the rebuilding process. 
Similar to the needs reviewed during the muck-out process, individuals/households 
needed money, materials, and the proper workforce to rebuild their homes.  
This example of the muck-out process should serve to highlight the challenges 
communities face in the aftermath of a hazard event. When one considers how much 
more difficult the situation becomes when communities are faced with so many 
challenges for a single task, compiled with all of the other tasks and activities involved 
with the response and recovery, it becomes clear that no one organization is sufficient to 
address all of the individual/household needs. One participant emphasized this point 
perfectly when they said, “It’s not just people on the ground doing the cleanup work, but 
also people bringing in supplies, people that manage those supplies, and donations that 
come in, and it’s people that help you with fund-raising and grants…” 
Thus far, the discussion has been confined to the hazard- and response-generated 
needs and has only hinted at how these needs influence the creation of a LVOAD. The 
remainder of this section will display how these needs impacted each community’s 
decision to pursue a LVOAD. A number of problems concerning response-generated 
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needs were noted in the interviews including duplication of resources, wasted resources, 
inter-organizational disagreements, and funding problems, to name a few. This next 
excerpt highlights duplication of resources in one of the communities: 
[Organization X] would bring in a bunch of cleaning buckets; thousands and 
thousands. Well, then you would have [Organization Y] doing the same thing. 
There are many things that are needed in a flood or any disaster, so if you’re 
working together and if [Organization X] is going to bring that in. Then 
[Organization Y] can bring something else in. 
The duplication of the cleaning buckets ultimately wasted community resources. 
The organizations that have an excess of cleanup supplies had to find a place to store the 
equipment; the money that was spent on the cleaning buckets could have been used 
elsewhere; and the manpower it took to move the cleaning buckets was wasted. Although 
duplication of services is a clear example of how important resources that could have 
better served individuals/households were going to waste, there were also situations 
where the opposite was acknowledged. This following quote highlights how coordinating 
cleanup buckets saved financial resources that could be used to help meet any number of 
unmet needs: 
One of the reasons why I think it’s great is because you know what everybody 
else is doing so you are not duplicating services. For instance we were giving out 
recently, just a ton of clean up kits and we were ordering them in, it’s a huge 
expense shipping them and then we find out that there is a faith based 
organization that has 600 of them sitting in a warehouse here in the State, so then 
they pitched in and started giving out cleanup kits. So, it works really well for us 
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all to keep talking to each other because there are gaps that each of us can fill and 
our mission is pretty specific. 
 Duplication of resources was not the only problem acknowledged by participants. 
Another issue involved volunteer management. It has previously been established that 
volunteers are a valuable asset in the response and recovery from hazard events. 
Volunteers can be used for just about any task and activity given they have the skills to 
accomplish the task. However, not all volunteers have the necessary skills to meet the 
needs of the communities. This discrepancy was highlighted by one participant who said, 
“…there is a lot of focus on spiritual/emotional [needs] and she needs more physical aid, 
volunteers that can help with sheltering, volunteers that will help with feeding...” This 
quote underlines the importance of maximizing the skill of the volunteers. This next 
quote describes a situation where the beginnings of communication and coordination 
between community organizations began to make better use of the volunteer force: 
I kept calling [Organization X] going, ‘there's got to be some way for people who 
can't do sandbags to help. And finally she called… and she's like, ‘I just don't 
know what to tell you,’ and it's like, ‘you can't tell me that you have enough food. 
You can't because I know how many people are out working. 
The post disaster atmosphere is not always such a productive setting. The data suggests 
organizations with similar missions are competing for resources and recognition in a high 
stress environment. The following quote describes some organizational disagreements: 
I guess I don't need to name organizations specifically but I think for a couple of 
them it was like, ‘I thought we were doing that?  Well that's our mission?  Well, 
that's our mission too’ [referring to another unnamed group]. Ok, we get it. It's not 
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about who does the most. Kinda like I said previously. Making sure we're not 
missing anybody, so let's knock off the playground games. 
This quote provides further support for organizational competition: 
Different faith based organizations, volunteer organizations, other agencies, and 
non-profits can get a little bit out of shape if they have their own idea of how 
things should go and it’s not going that way. So, politics I guess. I’ve seen a little 
bit of it. 
Although unmet needs were mentioned by all participants (N=17) in all five 
communities, only three of the communities considered their unmet needs to remain after 
the initial community response. The other two communities said the majority of their 
unmet needs were taken care of during the initial response and early recovery phase by 
their respective Unmet Needs Committees. An Unmet Needs Committee is a group of 
individuals representing local organizations that form to identify and meet the needs of 
individuals in the aftermath of a hazard event (Phillips, 2009). The two communities that 
stated their needs were being met by their Unmet Needs Committee were also the two 
communities that decided not to pursue becoming official LVOADs. Therefore, there is 
evidence to suggest needs/unmet needs play a role in the creation of a LVOAD. 
All five communities developed an Unmet Needs Committee, which showed to be 
influential in the creation of a LVOAD. However, the connection is not quite as clear as 
the connection that has already been outlined. In some LVOADs, the Unmet Needs 
Committee spun off from the LVOAD as described in the following, “…we would have 
our VOAD meeting and then right immediately to follow we would have unmet needs.” 
Although the Unmet Needs Committee worked in unison with the LVOAD in three of the 
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communities, in the other two communities, the Unmet Needs Committee actually took 
on a more competitive nature. One participant stated, “…at that point more of the actual 
response was over, and it was pretty much into recovery and so the coordination that 
needed to be done was basically done through the unmet needs committee.” This next 
excerpt from another community supports this finding: 
They really found no need to be formed into a [Community E] VOAD, so they 
were just sticking with the unmet needs [committee], but what we did do is we did 
meet a few times. We did talk. We did do some exchanges within the groups, the 
counties, the principals and found out there was just not that much need to set 
something up even though they wanted to set something up. And so they are 
leaving that as an option for the future. 
These final quotations reiterate the primary reason that Community E decided not to 
continue with the LVOAD: 
Our need was so small that it was hard to identify the need. Now we know that 
two large neighborhoods were affected with at least 6 inches to a foot of water in 
their house. Some of those were large Hispanic speaking population, so 
automatically it was hard for us to reach out to them and get them to want to come 
and say, hey, we have these resources for you. Just because historically they don’t 
trust government and that’s fine we know that. The others were people that were 
very proud, kinda older adults in this other neighborhood. They were like, ‘we’re 
self sufficient. We’ve been self sufficient for the last 50 years.’ But I think there 
wasn’t a large enough need for our VOAD to sustain itself. 
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Again I just don’t think there was enough need to continue a VOAD really… 
either [needs were being met], or the needs weren’t there, or the needs were being 
met by another way. And that’s why we [were] very careful after a month or two 
[not] to call it a VOAD. Because a VOAD brings with it an organization, a 
committee, a structure. 
It is clear that unmet needs play a role in the creation of LVOADs, but it is 
unclear just how big a role they play. The evidence presented above shows that all of the 
communities had some degree of unmet needs, but the two that chose not to progress with 
their LVOADs felt they had fulfilled their unmet needs early in recovery or were meeting 
the needs in other ways. They noted that the needs were being met and the tasks and 
activities dealing with these needs were already being undertaken, ultimately eliminating 
the need for a LVOAD in their communities. The reverse situation also provides support 
as evidenced by the two communities that did become official LVOADs and the one 
community in the process of becoming a official LVOAD. In these three communities, 
there were persistent hazard- and response-generated needs leading up to the creation of 
the LVOAD and for some time after LVOAD formation. 
Leadership 
 The leadership category consists of three factors. The first factor is external 
support from an individual or organization. The second factor is the presence of a 
motivated individual, or advocate. The third factor is the development of a core group of 
committed individuals/ organizations. Each of the five communities had at least one 
factor within the leadership category. However, all three leadership factors were not 
present in all five of the communities in this study, but they were present in the two 
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communities with official LVOADs and the one community that was in the process of 
creating a LVOAD. This suggests leadership is a very important factor for LVOAD 
creation.  
The three factors (i.e. external support, a motivated individual, and a core group 
or individuals/organizations) did not appear to arise in any particular chronological order 
in the creation of a LVOAD. In addition, the three factors appeared to be interdependent; 
meaning the manifestation and development of each factor was dependent upon the 
existence of the other factors. The factors and their connections will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
External Support 
 External support for LVOAD development came from emergency managers, State 
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (SVOAD) representatives, and Voluntary 
Agency Liaisons (VALs) with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
The support provided by these entities showed to be a factor influencing the creation of 
the LVOADs in this study. External support was apparent in all five communities to 
varying degrees. In one community, the primary external support came from the State 
VOAD and a government entity, both of whom actively participated in the LVOAD. In 
another community, the external support was much less noticeable and consisted of a 
simple recommendation by a government official to pursue a LVOAD in their 
community. In the other three communities, the state VOAD acted in an advisory 
capacity and offered assistance and guidance upon request. External support from 
SVOAD representatives was referenced in all (N = 17) of the interviews. The degree to 
which the SVOAD representatives played a role in the formation of a LVOAD varied by 
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location. At one extreme, LVOAD representatives took a leadership role within the 
LVOAD and at another were merely offering support and guidance upon request.  
One community had a SVOAD representative serving a leadership position in the 
LVOAD. However, in most cases, the SVOAD’s role was confined to spurring interest in 
the LVOAD concept and providing information on how LVOADs could benefit their 
communities. In addition to the varying degrees of influence that the SVOAD had in each 
community, there was also variance as to the point at which SVOAD introduced the 
concept to the communities. As previously discussed, the two communities that did not 
pursue officially forming a LVOAD only had one hazard event. In these cases, the 
SVOAD used that one event as an opportunity to introduce the LVOAD concept. In 
another community, it appeared that a SVOAD representative contacted the community 
after the second consecutive year of a disaster. In the other two communities, it was not 
clear at which point SVOAD became involved. This timeline discrepancy may be 
attributed to participants simply forgetting dates and times. Some participants noted that 
the seasons of disaster “blurred together” and reported difficulty recollecting dates, and 
even years, from memory.  
When one considers the SVOAD’s motives behind starting a LVOAD, it appears 
to come down to common sense. Since the SVOAD representatives respond to disasters 
across the state, it would be advantageous to have partners in as many locations as 
possible, especially the communities that repeatedly deal with hazard events. Regardless 
of the SVOAD’s motives, SVOADs provided external support for LVOAD creation in 
the five communities in this study. The following quote demonstrates how the SVOAD 
acted to instigate interest in LVOADs: 
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It was pretty much the State VOAD saying, ‘hey you guys need to get a group 
going together there locally.’ And usually somebody on the State VOAD helped 
to get it started because they understand that you kind of have to take these local 
partners and foundations, and banks, and county agents, and emergency 
managers, and get them together and start conversing and deciding. 
As mentioned, SVOAD representatives served in an advisory capacity and offered 
support for communities that had an interest in forming a LVOAD. In some cases, there 
was already a SVOAD representative operating within the impacted community. In these 
cases, the representative would attend community meetings and bring up the LVOAD 
concept during the community meetings. In other cases, the SVOAD representative 
would be invited to attend a community meeting or would hold their own community 
meeting. This next excerpt is an example of the latter: 
I don’t remember if we started in [Year X] or thereabouts, but, what happened is 
that we were in another spring of disaster and the State VOAD held a meeting 
here in [Community B]. And a couple of us locals were asked to present on 
stuff… And they did a nice job on that so they said if we wanted to organize 
something, if we wanted to put together a [LVOAD], if we wanted to organize 
some training sessions, if we wanted to bring in some representatives on 
resiliency, we can do that. And we did.” 
In other cases, the SVOAD representative lived and worked in the impacted community 
and wore multiple “hats.” In addition to having responsibilities to the SVOAD, they also 
had responsibilities to their organization as they were attempting to start up a LVOAD. 
This concept of wearing multiple hats was frequently cited by participants as a factor that 
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influenced LVOAD creation. This consideration will be discussed in greater detail later 
in this chapter. This next quote discusses the concept of wearing “multiple hats” and how 
complex and difficult the role could become: 
She [Referring to a SVOAD member] was the initial person that worked to get 
those set up and running. They worked through the [SVOAD] and then that 
[LVOAD] also… Those groups also spun off into the unmet need[s]. So, it was 
kinda a crossover. The VOAD had separate committees, but a lot of members 
from the VOAD were on both. It was just a case where, you wear those hats.  
Another means of support was to suggest the LVOAD adopt a structure similar to 
that of the SVOAD. The SVOAD Board in comprised of a Chair, Vice Chair, Secretary, 
and Treasurer. It has voting members and associate members that act in advisory roles, 
but do not have official voting status. The SVOAD also has by-laws, which drive the 
mission and provides rules and guidelines on how the SVOAD operates. One participant 
with the SVOAD highlighted this support role when they stated, “I had the conference 
call with [a LVOAD] this morning and I sent them our State VOAD by-laws. As a 
guideline so they don’t have to reinvent the wheel.” 
Although the SVOAD has a lot to gain from forming LVOADs in communities 
across their respective states, this should not suggest that it does not have benefits for the 
communities interested in forming LVOADs. This next excerpt shows how SVOAD 
support benefits the LVOAD by offering technical advice: 
…we had almost technical assistance with some things, ‘here’s how we have done 
it in the past, you guys can do it this way, you don’t have to, but here’s an idea,’ 
which was wonderful because we were out middle of nowhere. ‘We know we 
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want to do this but how do we set it all up?’ So having a framework from other 
people [SVOAD representatives] was very nice. 
As the above demonstrate, SVOADs serve an important role in the creation of a 
LVOAD. In four of the five communities, the SVOAD representative inspired LVOAD 
interest and acted in an advisory capacity aiding with activities such as providing 
examples of by-laws, offering technical assistance, and proposing a structure and 
framework. In the other LVOAD, the SVOAD representative was directly responsible for 
the creation of the LVOAD and served in a leadership position after the LVOAD formed. 
However, even in this last case, there was external support from government entities as 
well.  
Although VOADs are traditionally comprised of nonprofits, government also 
played a role in the creation of the LVOADs in this study. Government organizations 
include offices of emergency management, human service agencies, departments of 
public health, social service agencies, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
to name a few. Government played a role in all five of the communities in this study. In 
most cases, the government organizations served in an advisory capacity as associate 
members, meaning they did not have voting privileges. Although all government 
organizations involved in response or recovery operations may stand to gain from having 
a LVOAD in their community, emergency managers may benefit uniquely. Emergency 
managers are responsible for getting information to organizations involved with response 
and recovery. The emergency managers provided information to the LVOADs on 
response and recovery operations. In communities with LVOADs, the emergency 
manager has a channel to reach several of these organizations at one time, saving them 
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time and effort. A government representative discusses the role they had in the creation 
of the LVOAD in the following excerpt: 
And so, I kinda gave her [LVOAD Advocate] the go ahead and said this really 
needs to be a kinda a groundswell effort and a commitment by these organizations 
to be part of this, because if I drive it, you know, then it seems like I have to be 
there every step of the way to keep this thing going, keep members involved, and 
keep meeting, you know, happening, and that kind of stuff. So, she agreed and we 
gathered some of the key folks that have been active in disasters from some of 
these local organizations together and kinda laid the thought, the idea, the 
proposal out. We got a lot of buy-in from folks because they had been doing this 
all along and they saw the value as well. To put some real good structure behind 
what we were trying to do. 
In addition to the benefits provided by an efficient communication channel, emergency 
managers also have the opportunity to make LVOADs a permanent part of their 
operations by writing them into their plans. This next quote describes how an emergency 
manager incorporated LVOADs into the emergency planning process and how the 
LVOAD can be utilized for volunteer management: 
You know, we've built [LVOADs] into our plans. You know, our volunteer 
annex. [LVOAD] is an important part of that. You identify the different kinds of 
groups that come. You know, the spontaneous volunteers, the volunteer 
organizations, the professional volunteers organizations. But they're a key part of 
what we do and I'm very pleased we were finally able to get that organized and 
get it going. 
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The above citations serve another purpose beyond underlining the benefits behind 
supporting LVOAD development. The emergency managers were limited in their ability 
to assume leadership positions within the LVOAD. In three of the communities, the 
emergency managers assumed an advisory role providing pertinent information in regards 
to the city or county. This next quotation highlights this point: 
I have not taken a big role in on the VOAD, just because of my standpoint and my 
position here as the EM for the county. That’s kind of why I will participate in the 
meetings, and be a [associate] member of the VOAD, but I don’t step out and take 
any leadership roles in it. 
In addition to SVOAD and emergency manager involvement, the other 
government entities also played a role in two of the communities in this study. Although 
the role of government was limited in regards to leadership roles, government agencies 
served as associate members offering expertise and resources. In some cases government 
organizations served as information sources on how to get VOADs up and running, as 
described in the following quote: 
We then basically go out as community organizers and let people know we’re 
here and let the VOAD especially know that we are here. Then we work with 
them on helping get something organized in the way of long term recovery 
groups, unmet need groups, and if there is no VOAD, we also try to get one set up 
for the future. 
This sentiment was supported by a member of another community who said, “I guess the 
idea was started by the [government representative], who was there because of the 
potential disaster.” This final excerpt was by a government employee who attempted to 
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spearhead the LVOAD and inspire a nonprofit to take the lead, only to table the idea 
when nobody stepped forward: 
So, I knew that VOADs existed and you could start your own local VOAD and I 
had a lot of assistance from the state and FEMA in thinking through that process. 
How do you create one? How do you organize the groups? And we gave it a shot. 
Like I said, no one came to the table, so then I was like, let’s rename it instead. 
Instead of trying to organize a formal committee with a president and trying to 
address that, we’ll just make it a network and we’ll leave it as this network of 
organizations to which they can all bring something to the table, but we need to 
still send the person into the network. 
Interestingly enough, the two communities that cited a government representative 
as one of the initial LVOAD proponents in their communities, did not go on to become 
official LVOADs. The citations illustrate the varying roles of government in relation to 
the creation of a LVOAD across the five communities. The evidence presented in this 
section suggests that those within governmental organizations are better served acting in 
an informational/advisory role, rather than a leadership role. Although government did 
fulfill leadership positions in three of the five communities at one point in time, it proved 
problematic due to the inherent limitations of government. It is clear that some degree of 
external support was necessary to inspire the LVOAD premise, but it was unclear which 
type of external support was most beneficial to LVOAD creation.  
Motivated Individual 
A motivated individual was pointed to time and time again when asked what the 
keys to the success in LVOAD creation were. In each case, a motivated individual was 
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advocating for its creation. A motivated individual was a factor in all five communities 
and was brought up in all of the interviews (N=17). It was the most explicitly stated 
factor of all of the aspects discussed in this study, apart from possibly the hazard event(s) 
itself. In each of the five communities, the motivated individual was a local community 
member who took it upon themselves to take the necessary steps in getting a LVOAD 
generated in their communities.  
In addition to being motivated and advocating for LVOADs, a key characteristic 
of the motivated individual seemed to be that they needed to be a member of the 
nonprofit community, as opposed to a government organization. It may seem intuitive 
that the motivated individual would be a member of the nonprofit community, but in two 
of the communities, members of government organizations were the primary advocates 
for the LVOAD. In one community where the motivated individual was in a 
governmental role, the individual recognized the need for nonprofit leadership and sought 
out a motivated individual within the local nonprofit community. The individual was 
unsuccessful in finding a motivated individual in the nonprofit community, which 
ultimately led to the group deciding not to pursue an official LVOAD. In the other 
community where the motivated individual was in a governmental role, there was some 
discrepancy among the community members that felt the LVOAD group was not an 
official LVOAD since an individual in a governmental role was leading it. In this 
community, members of the nonprofit community stepped forward and assumed the role 
of the motivated individual and the individual within government stepped down. At the 
time this research was conducted, this community was in the process of making their 
LVOAD official. These two communities lend support for the importance of the 
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motivated individual being a member of a nonprofit organization versus a government 
organization since the other three communities did not have the same problems when the 
motivated individual was a member of the nonprofit community. The following 
quotations provide further support for the importance of having the LVOAD advocate 
come from the nonprofit community: 
The main person who was trying to get it organized was the Community E 
Emergency Manager. And that’s usually not the case. It’s usually someone from a 
voluntary agency. His intentions were good. His intentions were one hundred 
percent good. He did the right thing. He asked us for help. He asked other 
agencies. He knew it wasn’t a government thing that should be done. He was able 
to bring in the faith-based and voluntary organizations whose charters work in 
disasters. He realized counties really don’t take the lead on this. Government 
doesn’t really take the lead on it. 
…we all agreed as emergency managers, we can’t hold up this [LVOAD] if we 
don’t have someone from the community come and take this on. So, in agreement, 
we all were like, “maybe this isn’t the right time.’ maybe we need to go back and 
look at what we have in our communities, build those networks, and then come 
back together and maybe try again in the future. 
One role that the motivated individual had was to motivate individuals from other 
nonprofit and government organizations involved with response and recovery activities. 
This first quote describes the motivated individual seeking support from a member of a 
government organization: 
	   62 
And one of the persons who was actively involved in this [response and recovery] 
group, and a little bit frustrated with how it was going, came to me and said, ‘You 
know [Name X], here's how it works in reality.’  And she kinda said, ‘You know, 
you really need to understand what we can do for you.’  And so, I started listening 
and thinking and she and I started talking together and saying, ‘you know, there's 
this concept called COAD, where we take the VOAD, which is a state asset, and 
we replicate it at the local level.’ 
This next quote provides further support for the importance of a motivated individual. It 
also highlights the importance of having that leader be a part of the nonprofit community: 
 [Individual X] was really, you know, she was the unofficial driver of this whole 
thing and really had been prior to that. I described the director of [Organization 
Y] and the director of [Organization Z] were the governmental kinda leaders, but 
[Individual X] was always there in the background. She was the leader for the 
non-profits side. You know, that really kinda kept the idea alive and that I 
communicated with over a period of a few years to kinda get to the point where 
we really got an organization started. 
This next quote points to the importance of the leader being energetic and motivated: 
So you just have to watch out and make sure that who you have in your leadership 
positions are energetic and keep everybody motivated to keep it going because 
when that doesn’t happen, the energy isn’t apparent, it starts to wane a bit. 
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Thus far, the conversation has been on the motivated individual spurring interest and 
garnering support for a LVOAD. However, there is also an important element of time 
involved. This next quote shows the importance of having sustained motivation. 
It’s going to be up to the leadership. Basically, if they can keep it going. My 
personal feelings, from what I’m seeing, I see them doing that. That they will 
keep interest in it. And it is hard to keep interest during peacetime. So, it’s really 
important that they come up with something… 
Since creating a LVOAD is a time consuming process that can take years in some cases, 
it is important that the leader possess motivation that is consistent and lasting. This next 
quote provides further support: 
[Individual X] was, you know, she was energetic, and positive, and encouraging, 
and, you know, [Individual X] is one of those folks that ah... she gets an idea and 
she won't let go. But she understood. She had to be patient with us because of 
what was going on. We just couldn't say, ok, we're gonna do it and just do it. We 
had to get a little bit of time to take a breath and let things happen. 
Each of the communities that succeeded in creating a LVOAD offered examples of the 
need for motivated leadership. More support can be derived from the communities that 
did not become official LVOADs. One participant stated it very simply when they said, 
“One thing you got to have is an in charge person. You know, somebody that can really 
get the group going, kind of a key person.” Further support was given by another 
participant who stated, “And basically, the key to having a group like that is having 
someone who is going to spearhead it; keep it going; to do the work associated with it so 
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that the other people can just come.” This next quote illustrates a common problem 
potential leaders face when trying to garner community support for a LVOAD: 
So I think that our biggest problem in [Community C] is having that main person 
who rodeos everybody together. I always think, ‘it should be me, it should be me, 
you should do it, you should do it.’ I just don’t have the time in the day. 
It has been established that a motivated leader is a key factor in the creation of a 
LVOAD, but there is another element that has already been touched upon. The individual 
needs to be a part of the nonprofit community, otherwise there are likely to be some 
problems: 
It was not a VOAD and we were calling it a VOAD and it was purposed to be a 
VOAD. Initially there were volunteer agencies, then at one point the county was 
asked to run the meetings, to be in charge, and discussion on that was they are not 
a volunteer organization. There were some groups that said they were not going to 
continue as long as there is a government entity in charge, which is not a 
volunteer organization. 
The final factor regarding the motivated leader deals once again with time. 
Although there was a large degree of variance regarding the length of time the motivated 
individual stayed involved with the LVOAD group, the original motivated individual in 
each community eventually stepped down or stepped away from the LVOAD group they 
were largely responsible for creating. In the two communities that did not become official 
LVOADs, they lacked a motivated individual from the nonprofit community. In the other 
three communities, the length of time the motivated individual stayed involved in the 
LVOAD ranged from years in two of the communities, to only weeks in the other 
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community. It has been suggested that possessing sustained motivation is an important 
element of the motivated individual, but recognizing that one cannot remain the leader 
forever is also an important quality of the motivated individual. Perhaps the following 
statement by one of the participants best captures the essence of this premise: 
[Individual A] and I won’t be the leaders forever; there will have to be other 
people….Who’s going to lead this? And that’s going to be a challenge too, 
because again I won’t be the president or chairman forever, so who is going to do 
that after me? So, you have to find people who are committed and willing to do 
that. 
So, the leader needs to be prepared to pass the responsibility to others who are motivated 
and committed to continuing the LVOAD once their time as a leader is up. The leader 
needs to be capable of sparking interest in the LVOAD, sustaining interest in the 
LVOAD, and stepping back to allow others to pick up the leadership role. The following 
is an example of how this process looked in one of the communities, which was generally 
perceived as a successful passing of responsibility of the original motivated individual to 
the new motivated individuals: 
[Individual X], once you know, the official [LVOAD] group got organized, she 
kinda started stepping back… And so, she kinda walked away, not really walked 
away, but she kinda slowly backed away a little bit and gave leadership 
responsibilities to a few other people. 
Not all leadership changes were met with the same success. The following quote 
describes a situation in one of the communities where the leadership changes were not 
preplanned or predetermined: 
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So, there’s been nobody to show up and take over everything, so I took over the 
interim part because somebody had to do it, you know, and I didn’t know what 
else to do. And then, there was [Individual X] with me at the time and 
[they] withdrew... So, that’s how I got involved with that. I was just told to go to 
these meetings... 
As the evidence suggests, leadership is not complete if it is not coming from the 
nonprofit community. In one community, the individual was motivated and advocating 
for a LVOAD, but was from a government entity and, therefore, unable to effectively 
lead the LVOAD. In addition to being a member of the nonprofit community, the 
motivated individual advocates for an LVOAD in their community, possesses sustained 
motivation, and is prepared to vacate the leadership position and pass the responsibility to 
new leadership once they have instilled the necessary structure to keep the LVOAD 
going. This responsibility can be difficult for any one individual, which leads into the 
next factor – a core group of dedicated individuals. 
Core Group 
The motivated individual and external support are both key factors when 
considering LVOAD creation, but alone insufficient without the third factor – the 
formation of a core group of dedicated individuals. The definition of a core group very 
closely parallels that of the motivated leader. The major difference being that the core 
group consists of a group of three or four individuals that share common characteristics 
with the motivated individual. Therefore, it is a group of dedicated individuals within 
nonprofit organizations sharing sustained motivation who also advocate for the creation 
of LVOADs in their communities. Of the five communities, two LVOADs possessed a 
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core group of dedicated individuals. These two had motivated individuals prior to the 
formation of a core group and went on to become official LVOADs. Another community 
started showed some signs of possessing a core group, but because this LVOAD was still 
forming, there was not much information to be gathered regarding the core group. The 
other two communities lacked a core group and did not progress to official LVOADs. 
Because two of the communities lacked the core group altogether and the third 
was still in the process of developing a core group, this factor had the least amount of 
supporting evidence. However, there is some valuable data derived from the participants 
in the two communities with the core groups, as well as statements referring to lack of a 
core group in the two communities. Because of the close relationship with the motivated 
individual, the excerpts discussed in this section closely correspond with those within the 
motivated leader section. The core groups in the two communities shared common 
characteristics. The core groups were made up of individuals from both nonprofit and 
government organizations. Whereas the motivated individual was largely responsible for 
spurring interest and advocating for the LVOADs, they also acted as members of the core 
groups in the two communities that possessed both a motivated individual and a core 
group, rather than as leaders delegating tasks and activities to the core group. Therefore, 
the motivated individual was a member of the core group and shared tasks and activities 
amongst the group. 
The tasks and activities of the core group were very similar in the two 
communities. The core groups were the laborers who got the LVOAD up and running. 
Core group members discussed, developed, organized, and implemented ideas for how to 
improve community response and recovery. Examples of tasks included networking and 
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recruiting individuals from other response and recovery organizations, keeping track of 
contact information, setting up community meetings, and taking notes at meetings to 
name a few. In each case, the core group took the LVOAD concept and assisted in 
educating the community on what a LVOAD is and what it can do for the community. 
Participants regularly brought up the importance of having a group of committed 
individuals, which suggests an element of time and participation. The core group 
members were active participants in the LVOAD group and regularly attended 
community meetings and shared decision-making responsibilities. 
Participants described the formation of a core group as an “organic process” that 
occurred naturally when the same individuals from the same organizations were attending 
the same community meetings on community response and recovery following a disaster. 
One participant put it simply when they stated, “…we ended up getting a core group of 
people that represented [Community B].” This first quote describes the process in greater 
detail: 
And it was about that time that the [Organization X], it was [Individual X], with 
the [Organization X], myself, [Individual X] at [Organization Y], and [Individual 
Z] at [Organization Z]. We all got together and kinda, really under [Individual 
Y’s] direction, said, we need to make a formal process for this because if were 
gonna keep doing this, let's just have it. 
One recurring concern that arose when discussing the core group was when 
participants were asked when the core group formed. In both communities, the members 
who would eventually become part of the core groups knew each other very well before 
they decided to pursue a LVOAD. They regularly talked about seeing each other at 
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conferences and various community meetings. Therefore, timelines were fuzzy when 
asked when the core group formed and decided to pursue a LVOAD. Whereas some 
participants cited a lengthy process taking years to become official LVOADs, others 
described the process more simply. One participant stated, “There was a small group of 
us in [Year X] who met over the summer, wrote the by-laws and then in the fall of [Year 
X], we held elections.” This discrepancy is likely due to a number of factors. The 
participants’ memories likely played a factor and participants described the same event 
based on their own subjective experiences. Also, although the core group remained fairly 
consistent in both communities, there was some turnover of the core groups over time. 
Although there was some noted variance regarding time, both communities cited core 
groups as important to LVOAD creation. 
As mentioned, although the other communities did not possess a core group, they 
did have some valuable insight to share regarding the perceived importance of a core 
group. This next excerpt serves as an example of how lacking a core group negatively 
impacted the formation of the LVOAD: 
…for the longest time, it just felt like it was just me and [Individual X], we were 
pretty much the only people. And there are a few others like the [Organization Y], 
we do have a [Organization Y] office here in [Community C], and sometimes they 
come, most often not. We just don’t get the turn-out or the participation that it 
just, kind of fell the way-side. 
The core group served an important role in the creation of an LVOAD by completing 
tasks and activities that were necessary to advocate for the LVOAD concept. However, 
the tasks and activates changed as the LVOAD progressed towards creation and new 
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roles and responsibilities developed. This brings up a very important aspect of a core 
group. When the core group first started meeting, it was very informal and was very team 
oriented with no one individual taking official leadership of the organization. However, 
as the LVOADs became more official, the core groups in both communities eventually 
adopted formal leadership roles and responsibilities. This becomes important when the 
core group faces turnover within the core group. In both communities, the formal leaders 
were members of the core groups. This next quote discusses the successful leadership 
transference from the original leader to an individual in the core group. “So, there were 
three kinda folks who stepped up to the plate and said, we'll accept leadership positions 
within this [LVOAD] organization.” 
Of the five communities, two developed a core group of dedicated individuals that 
were willing to serve in leadership positions, regularly attend meetings, and develop by-
laws and organizational structures. Of the other three communities, one was in the 
process of developing a LVOAD organizational structure and did not yet have a core 
group of dedicated individuals identified, one was not able to maintain a core group of 
more than two individuals, and the other had a core group of individuals in governmental 
positions, but lacked the committed members in the nonprofit community. Neither of 
these aforementioned communities progressed to officially creating a LVOAD. It seemed 
that those groups that possessed a motivated leader also possessed a strong core group. 
Therefore, evidence points to having a core group as an important factor in the 
development of a LVOAD. The two communities that possessed external support, a 
motivated individual, and a core group were the two communities that also developed an 
organizational structure, which is discussed in the next section. Of the two communities 
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that did not become official LVOADs, one lacked all three factors and the other 
community received some external support and showed signs of a motivated leader, but 
lacked a core group. 
LVOAD Organizational Structure 
 The general consensus among participants was that the development of an 
organizational structure was the point at which the LVOAD became official. There are 
three factors within this section. The first section discusses by-law formation. The second 
section discusses the role of elections, and the third section discusses recruitment. 
Participants viewed the formation of by-laws and the election of formal roles as the 
moments the LVOAD became real, actual, or official. However, participants often 
discussed by-law formation and elections as going hand-in-hand and rarely discussed the 
two as independent processes. In the two communities that produced official LVOADs, it 
was clear that the by-laws were obtained prior to elections. In the community that was in 
the process of creating an organizational structure, the elections were held before the by-
laws were written. However, participants often discussed by-law formation occurring 
concurrently with elections. This finding can be at least partially explained by the nature 
of by-law formation, which is a time consuming process that happened over the course of 
weeks or months. Some participants cited recruitment as happening prior to the LVOAD 
forming. Other participants mentioned recruitment occurring after the LVOAD was 
created. Although this discrepancy could be due to a number of factors, evidence 
suggests that both were true in both communities. It appeared recruitment was occurring 
at both points. 
	   72 
Two of the five communities researched in this study progressed to the point 
where they developed an organizational structure to guide the Local Voluntary 
Organization Active in Disaster (LVOAD), which dictates the leadership, mission, and 
overall function of the LVOAD. As evidenced in the previous section, the two groups 
that progressed to this stage of development had external support from the state VOAD, 
which is where each of them obtained information on how they could set up their 
respective by-laws. The fifth community was in the process of developing an 
organizational structure at the time this study was being conducted, so the organizational 
structure conversations are limited to the two that achieved LVOAD creation. The 
community that was in the process of LVOAD creation was seeking by-laws from the 
state and there is evidence to suggest the LVOAD organizational structure will be similar 
to that of the two LVOADs that reached creation.  
By-Law Formation 
As previously mentioned, by-law formation and elections are two separate things, 
but participants generally discussed them as going hand-in-hand. Participants described 
by-laws as a living, working document that regulated how the LVOAD conducted their 
business. Tasks and activities denoted in the by-laws included financial management, 
membership dues, membership composition, election procedures, leadership restrictions, 
meeting schedules, etc. In both communities that progressed to this stage of LVOAD 
development, a generic by-law document was “borrowed” from the State Voluntary 
Organization Active in Disaster (SVOAD) as a reference so the communities did not 
have to “start from scratch” or “reinvent the wheel,” as some of the participants put it. 
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The SVOAD by-laws mirrored the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 
(NVOAD) by-laws (National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, 2013). 
Both communities obtained and began working on the by-laws before they held 
elections. This may be partly due to the fact that the by-laws themselves contain rules and 
procedures for how to conduct elections. Most participants gave more weight to the 
significance of the by-laws. One participant put it bluntly when they said, “I would say it 
[the LVOAD] started with the small group of us that wrote the by-laws.” Another 
participant said, “I think the by-laws have really helped make it official that we are a 
group that does meet and will meet. Um, at least on a regular basis.” This statement 
reinforces the idea that the by-laws are necessary for the LVOAD to be considered 
official. There was a general consensus among participants that the by-laws were 
extremely important to help guide the LVOAD. This next statement illustrates this belief: 
We've got a system in place. And so, [Individual W] and [Individual X] and 
[Individual Y] and I and somebody else, I think it was [Individual Z], met over 
the summer to develop some by-laws, and about if this is gonna be an actual 
organization. And we're gonna be led by the community. What are our actual 
laws? I mean, are we going to have officers? Things like that. 
This next statement discusses how the LVOAD reworked the by-law format to help fit 
with their specific needs: 
And we actually borrowed some by-laws from the state VOAD. And we really 
just tweaked them a little bit about board membership and things like that and 
officers and rotations and who can be a member and who can't be a member. 
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Things like that. But after, it was the [Time X] we officially launched kinda that 
we're a [LVOAD]. 
In both communities, the by-law process was time a consuming process that lasted 
several weeks or months. This devotion of time and attention shows the significance that 
both communities gave to the bylaws. In one case the community made a separate 
committee within the LVOAD to work specifically on the by-laws. These next two 
excerpts capture the time element: 
We tried to use the bylaws as best as we could. It took us forever, well not forever 
but about 3 or 4 or 5 months to finally get a final copy of our bylaws and we 
started off using [Community A] as an example. We set up a special bylaws 
committee to bring it back to the entire VOAD to try to work it out that way. 
…they started  working on some by-laws. And then, we knew we were going to 
gather again in the fall, so that we could be talking a little bit. And so they got a 
preliminary by-laws set up. And then in November of [Year X] we met again. 
And started to form what was then called the [Community A LVOAD] So, that's 
how it first came to be was in [Month X of Year X]. And then we met again in 
[Month Y of Year Y]. They gave the paperwork on the by-laws. There was 
discussion and what did anybody want?  Were there other groups that people felt 
should be active and be called in? And so those invitations happened just from 
individuals who were present at the time. And then in [Month Y] we gathered and 
had an election of officers. 
Although both groups spent a great deal of time and energy in developing by-
laws, both communities noted that the by-laws were a “living document” that needed to 
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be revisited and revised as necessary. This next excerpt describes how the by-laws were 
revisited and revised to meet the needs of the community and how important it is to start 
with a strong foundation to build upon: 
I think that at first I thought ‘ok, this is good,’ but as the issues came up and 
things happened through the years I found that it was really good because we 
could just go back and look at the by-laws, what they said. And that turned out to 
be really important, so I think it is smart if you are going to start a [LVOAD] is 
take your time to develop the by-laws you want, that have the rules that you want 
that will make you effective. So, it was really important. 
In addition to guiding the regular activities of the LVOAD, the by-laws served another 
purpose. Since the by-laws were obtained from the SVOAD, they followed the same 
basic format with the same basic rules and regulations governing them. Although there 
were some changes to the original by-laws supplied by the state, participants cited 
conforming with the state VOAD as an important element to becoming a “legitimate” 
LVOAD, as evidenced by the following excerpt: 
[By-laws are] very important so that we have some structure in place and also so 
we can be a part of State and National VOAD. We want to be a part of this. We 
want to have legitimacy with the by-laws and we will have partner members and 
associate members. The associate members would be government agencies, 
would be the city, the county maybe even the university. That way, it legitimizes 
us. We are a local VOAD not just a loose group. We do have a purpose and gives 
us structure, so I think it would be very important.” 
	   76 
 Thus far, all evidence has been limited to participants from the two communities 
that become official LVOADs. There is much to be gained from taking a look at the two 
communities that never progressed to developing an organizational structure. One 
participant stated, “We don’t have By-Laws, we don’t have an organization set up like 
they do in [Community A].” When asked if they felt like an official LVOAD, another 
participant said, “It never got that far. No, it did not get that far. No.” These quotes 
further demonstrate the importance of by-laws as they show how participants felt that by-
laws were necessary in order to be official and that an organizational structure was the 
next logical step towards LVOAD creation. The next section discusses the counterpart to 
by-laws – elections.  
Elections 
The elections involved the LVOAD group members holding a democratic hearing 
to determine who would fulfill leadership positions on the board and who qualifies for 
membership and associate membership within the LVOAD. As mentioned, the 
procedures and guidelines for how to conduct elections were derived from the by-laws 
that the two official LVOADs borrowed from the SVOAD, which also mirrored the 
National VOAD (National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, 2013). The 
generic by-law document obtained from the state listed three different membership 
statuses. The board members consisted of a chair, vice-chair, secretary, and treasurer. 
According to the by-laws, the board members each have responsibilities related 
specifically to their positions that dictate how to undertake the tasks and activities of the 
LVOAD. The board members are from nonprofit organizations and are voting members. 
Next are the member organizations comprised of individuals largely from the nonprofit 
	   77 
community, who also have voting rights within the LVOAD. Lastly, there are associate 
members, who are made up of members of government and private sector organizations 
who do not retain voting rights. The associate members serve largely an advisory and 
informational role according to the SVOAD. 
Regarding elections, one LVOAD followed the SVOAD by-laws fairly closely 
and maintained the board member, member, and associate member status with similar 
voting privileges. They also only included membership dues of $25.00 for the board 
members and regular members. The other LVOAD had some notable differences. Instead 
of a chair and vice-chair, they had two co-chairs who shared leadership responsibilities. 
In addition, they had members of government organizations serving on the board and in 
regular member status. Although there were differences between the two LVOADs 
regarding composition, the elections were held in a similar fashion. One participant 
outlines the general process of elections when they said, “There was a small group of us 
in [Year X] who met over the summer, wrote the by-laws and then in the fall of [Year X] 
we held elections.” 
As mentioned, by-laws and elections were happening concurrently in both 
communities, as evidenced by the following excerpts:  
And then in [Month X] we gathered and had an election of officers. We had a 
presentation from [Individual Y] on what we could be expecting coming up. The 
authorization for the bylaws happened, so we kinda ...It was, and I don't know if 
incorporated is the right word, but that's what ended up happening is we got the 
organization formed and it became real in [Time X]. 
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They did an election least week and have 2 co-chairs up in [Community D] and 
they are indeed working on their by-laws now and we’ll have another meeting in 
[Month X], towards the end of [Month X] to formalize some of their functions. 
This last excerpt was taken from a participant in the community that was in the process of 
developing a LVOAD in their community. This community deviated from the other two 
in that they held their elections prior to by-law formation. 
I was elected President and she was like the vice-president. … We were elected at 
that meeting and we’re working on this together. She is going to do the by-laws 
and I am working on agendas for the next meetings that we will send out to 
everyone… 
 The by-law process and elections seem to be one of the defining factors on 
whether or not a LVOAD becomes official, as evidenced by both being present in the two 
communities that became official LVOAD and absent from the two communities that did 
not make it to this stage of LVOAD creation. In addition, the community that was in the 
process of LVOAD development at the time of this research was in the process of 
elections and by-law formation. Although the beginnings of by-law formation seemed to 
be the first step towards creating an organizational structure, it appeared that elections 
were largely perceived as something that was happening concurrently. The next section 
in this chapter discusses recruitment, which was also happening at the same time as by-
law formation and elections. 
Recruitment 
 Organizational recruitment was a factor that appeared to occur in conjunction 
with the by-law and electoral processes. Recruitment involved sending out invitations to 
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attend the initial LVOAD meetings. These invitations were happening through word-of-
mouth, email, telephone calls, letters, brochures, and newsletters. The recruitment in the 
communities targeted organizations that the LVOAD members believed might have had a 
part to play during times of disaster. Neither community mentioned a specific target 
population. Both mentioned reaching out to organizational members with disaster 
specific missions, government agencies that may provide resources in times of disaster, 
organizations from neighboring counties and communities, technical experts, hospitals, 
and hazard specific experts. 
 Recruiting was important for a couple of reasons. First, LVOAD members 
regularly cited the need for current up-to-date information. Second, participants regularly 
mentioned instances where they were unable to reach individuals in need because they 
did not have a relationship with crucial individuals and organizations. These 
organizations included local government officials and nonprofit groups with important 
abilities and resources. Recruiting these individuals would potentially increase the 
valuable resources they offer and, ultimately, to better serve individuals with needs. 
Three communities mentioned engaging in recruitment. These same three communities 
were also the ones that made it to the organizational structure stage of LVOAD 
development.  
 The means of recruitment varied between LVOADs and for each LVOAD over 
time. The following quote touches upon the selection process for recruitment and was 
limited to word-of-mouth at the time of the community’s first discussions of recruitment: 
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There was discussion and what did anybody want?  Were there other groups that 
people felt should be active and be called in?  And so those invitations happened 
just from individuals who were present at the time. 
These next excerpts compare how recruitment looked at different points in time for the 
same LVOAD:  
In the very beginning we sent out letters introducing the [LVOAD] and what it 
was, what its purpose was, and how they could play a role and be useful to them. 
And we just, we thought as a group that with all the different organizations maybe 
even ones that we never involved, we thought this would be great to have them 
involved. So the beginning was letters, then it was followed up with some phone 
calls if we knew, called like pastor organizations and different things. And then 
once we had the first meeting, then we got email address, and it’s pretty much has 
been email after that. 
…it kind of ended up being a word of mouth thing. We didn’t do any active 
recruiting. It was pretty much ‘Hey! Here’s what we’re doing. We are out here. If 
you want to be here, wonderful, if you don't that’s ok, too. We’re just going to try 
to do what we can with whoever wants to be involved.’ 
 Although recruitment was mentioned as a factor present in this stage of the 
creation process, it was somewhat of a murky subject. It was difficult to discern how 
successful recruitment practices were. At this stage of LVOAD development, it did not 
appear as though any of the LVOADs had a designated person to engage in recruitment. 
The telephone calls, emails, and word-of-mouth conversations were being undertaken by 
multiple members of the LVOAD on an ad-hoc basis. This led to duplication of 
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recruitment practices within the LVOADs and problems with record keeping regarding 
what organizations had already been recruited. It was also unclear how many people and 
organizations were contacted by each LVOAD. The entire recruitment process seemed to 
be very loose and unorganized. 
Barriers 
 The factors within the hazard event and leadership category serve as motivators or 
pressures that push the Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOAD) 
forward towards creation. However, there are also counter pressures, which are forces 
that are constantly pushing on the LVOADs in the opposite direction. These counter 
pressures act to hinder or ultimately to prevent the LVOADs from reaching creation. The 
categories discussed thus far that facilitated the creation of a LVOAD followed a rather 
progressive order starting with the hazard event and ending with the official creation of a 
LVOAD. These factors were ever-present forces throughout the creation stages and often 
occurred simultaneously, resulting in interconnected, and compounding barriers. The 
following three barriers are discussed in this section: burnout, meeting fatigue, and 
disaster competition.  
Burnout 
 Burnout was listed as a factor in four of the five communities researched in this 
study as revealed by (N=15) participants who cited it as a barrier to the creation of 
LVOADs in their communities. In the interviews, burnout commonly referred to 
individuals’ physical and mental stress caused by dealing with hazard events while 
attempting to maintain personal and professional lives. It is important to reiterate that 
individuals that make up a LVOAD are voluntarily donating their time in an effort to get 
	   82 
the LVOAD up and off the ground. These LVOAD members are juggling their own 
personal and professional duties not to mention dealing with the newfound pressures 
caused by the hazard event(s). These stressors accumulate over time and should serve as 
an ever-present reminder of the pressure that these individuals are constantly under. One 
participant explained how burnout affects an individual if they are experiencing repetitive 
hazard events when they said, “…if we have too many disasters, I also see that people 
will get really burned out. And, ‘I'm just sick of doing this.’ And even a sense of 
complacency in that, ‘We're gonna go sandbag. OK, great [sarcastically].’” The concept 
of burnout was echoed by another participant who stated, “When I first went there, it 
always seemed very easy going and whatever and it just felt like everybody just kinda hit 
their wall, just like mentally and physically just done.” The following excerpts further 
highlight how burnout affected LVOAD members: 
…why is nobody coming? Why won’t nobody vote? Why won’t anybody 
anything? And what they found out is because Community B is constantly in this 
flooding thing and the mentality is that you never know what the [flood] is going 
to do. People are just over it. So even now when I sent out an email, I think two 
weeks ago, saying, ‘Does anybody have anything they’d like to meet; discuss?’ 
And not an answer. I didn’t get one answer from anybody up in that region. 
You know there’s probably some compassion fatigue. You know, you get so 
many people in these different professions and… you get these calls from people 
and you’re constantly getting these calls and it wears on you after a while… you 
know after constant, constant, constant [calls], eventually you are gonna burn out. 
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Whereas the above statements serve as examples of how burnout due to repetitive 
hazard events negatively impacted the LVOADs in their respective communities, these 
next quotes emphasize how burnout was partially relieved in these same communities 
when they experienced a recess from disaster: 
It's been tough and I think people are tired, so I'm really grateful that everybody's 
truly getting a break from this flood season. People are very, very worn out from 
those that are at risk of losing their homes, that have lost their homes, to the many 
man-hours of work, the volunteer work. It's just, I'm really grateful that 
everybody's getting a break. And I'm giving, it's also giving us an opportunity to 
get more organized and know that there's a lot more out there than just flooding. 
Right now, you know, we're managing. We’re pretty new. It takes time to grow 
and be in place. And actually not have a disaster, so you can grow and get some 
stability underneath you. Cause when you're always in crisis, it's not good. It's not 
good on the body, or the organizations, or anything. 
This next quote describes how burnout has affected their LVOAD and looks at burnout 
with optimism and view it a hurdle for their LVOAD to overcome: 
You’ve probably heard this before, you know, it’s a marathon, not a sprint. But 
people want to sprint and be done. So yeah, you do see that and that is probably 
why some of these agencies and groups have dropped out. Not all of them, but 
maybe some. Some have decided, ‘we’ve had enough. We helped for 6 or 8 
months, we did our part.’ And that’s ok and the thing about the VOAD is you 
have people who have done it for 8 months and need a break. Then someone else 
can say, ‘we’ll pick up from there and go on. We’ll get the baton and move on.’ 
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In each of the examples provided, burnout affected the LVOAD members by 
adding pressure onto individuals who are already in stressful situations balancing their 
personal and professional lives on top of their responsibilities to the LVOAD. 
Participants repeatedly hinted that if they had to choose between their personal lives, 
professional lives, and the LVOAD, they chose the LVOAD as the only expendable 
option. The above excerpts suggest that burnout had a significant impact on the creation 
of LVOADs in four of the communities. The fifth community did not progress far enough 
into the development stages of a LVOAD to experience burnout. As discussed in the 
introduction to this chapter, burnout was often compounded on top of other barriers, 
which only adds to the overall influence of burnout on the creation of LVOADs.  
Meeting Fatigue 
 Meeting fatigue was a factor observed in all (N=17) of the interviews to varying 
degrees. This barrier encompasses situations where LVOADs were competing with other 
various meetings the LVOAD members were obligated to participate in for their 
respective organizations. Examples of other meetings include Long-Term Recovery 
Committee (LTRC) meetings, Unmet Needs Committee meetings, State Voluntary 
Agencies Active in Disaster (SVOAD) meetings, city, county, and community meetings, 
and individual LVOAD member’s organizational meetings. Numerous meetings can take 
their toll on the LVOAD members, who may be stretched thin across all of the potential 
meetings they may be required to attend. In many cases, the only meeting that they have a 
choice in attending were the LVOAD meetings, since it was entirely a voluntary position, 
whereas many of the others were mandatory or strongly recommended by their 
leadership. This dilemma highlights the relationship between meeting fatigue and 
	   85 
burnout, as making it to LVOAD meetings was regularly referenced as a factor of 
burnout. This first quote underlines how closely related the LVOAD meetings were with 
their community’s Unmet Needs Committee: “…they coincide so closely, that we would 
have our [LVOAD] meeting and then right immediately to follow we would have unmet 
needs.” 
It should come as no surprise that some LVOADs did not survive to creation 
when they are having meetings that coincide so closely with other meetings that they may 
be deemed somewhat impractical if they are discussing the same or similar issues in their 
LVOAD meetings. In addition to discussing similar material in meetings, other times 
meeting fatigue can be a simple case of too many meetings as illustrated by one 
participant who stated, “I think everybody has so many meetings that they just don’t 
come.” The following excerpts discuss this predicament and how difficult it can be on 
individuals: 
Often times it’s tough, when there’s a regional disaster, to send the same person to 
two different meetings. Especially, when they are happening on the same day. 
You have to go from [City X] to [City Y]… I mean there were a few people that 
were like, ‘Yeah, I just hurried down here from [City X] and I have to go back to 
[City Y] tonight.’ 
Since there was only a small collective group, those members that… you know, 
have key things they do in their own professions, other commitments that I think a 
person commits themselves to so many things that it just kind of.. there’s a lot 
of… timing was off, as far as trying to fit in 14 meetings in one day, you know 
what I mean, it was kind of like that. 
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In some cases, meeting fatigue was one of the primary influences on the decision to stop 
meeting as a LVOAD. The following dialogue with Community C members shows how 
meeting fatigue contributed to their decision not pursue becoming an official LVOAD: 
So, that’s where we’ve just kind of dropped it and left it be because the five or six 
of us that are semi-involved in Community C, we all attend the State VOAD ones, 
so we are on their conference calls and attend their meetings. So we just kind of 
use that as our source of networking and information. 
…the reason we stopped meeting wasn’t really like a conscious thing, it was the 
Long-Term Recovery Committee formed to take care of the unmet needs. And so, 
most of the people were on both groups, and so we started to coordinate through 
the Long-Term recovery and Unmet Needs Committee after that.” 
We decided that since the same people were involved, we would basically do that 
business as part of the Long-Term Recovery Committee. That was decided in the 
meeting, because obviously during the disaster, people don’t have a lot of spare 
time. So that’s the best way of coordinating. 
Meeting fatigue was also a factor in Community E’s decision not to proceed with an 
official LVOAD as evidenced by the following excerpt: 
So, why would the state VOAD have a meeting and then the same players go to 
another meeting down the road, when again, you’re always worrying about time. 
How much time do you have to do your projects, things you want to work on, and 
then meet as well. 
 Meeting fatigue was one of the primary reasons given for the demise of the two 
LVOADs that did not develop into an official LVOAD. It was also referenced as a major 
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issue in the other three communities and clearly influenced the creation of the LVOADs. 
The two LVOADs that developed an organizational structure had written in their by-laws 
that regular meetings would be held quarterly and as often as weekly in times of disaster. 
These time demands resulted in a considerable amount of time that members were 
expected to give up in order to get the LVOAD up and running. As evidenced by the 
excerpt and quotes provided in this section, many LVOAD members felt it was simply 
impractical to continue to meet when the information discussed in the LVOAD meetings 
was exactly the same as what is discussed in other mandatory meetings. At some point, 
individuals had to decide if duplicated information is worth the time it takes to go out of 
their way to attend a purely voluntary LVOAD meeting. In many cases, they simply 
chose to skip or postpone the meetings 
Disaster Competition 
 Disaster competition refers to situations when larger or more salient disasters 
occur in nearby communities, which divert attention away from the smaller hazard 
events. In effect, supplies, volunteers, disaster organizations, and public attention are 
diverted from the smaller scale disaster to a bigger disaster in the nearby region or state. 
Disaster competition was a barrier to LVOAD creation in two of the five communities in 
this study. In the other three communities, the communities that made it to creation either 
did not experience disaster competition, because they did not have any other disasters to 
compete with in their regions or they had the largest or most salient disasters in their 
region. The most notable affect that disaster competition had on LVOADs was temporary 
absence of LVOAD core member organizations and LVOAD core members. An example 
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of this notion was provided when one participant remarked, “…you’d see the same 
organizations represented. Often times it’s tough when there’s a regional disaster…” 
This next excerpt displays how a large-scale disaster within the same state pulled 
important LVOAD organizations from the respective communities: 
Um, so I see it growing. It’s really a time thing. It kind of faltered a bit last year 
because of the flooding in [City X and City Y]. Because so many of our main 
organizations were out there fighting the floods. 
This next quote describes how the larger disaster in the region soaked up the state disaster 
organizations that would have been active with their LVOAD group, leaving them 
without organizations they considered to be key organizations to run a LVOAD: 
Unfortunately we don’t have a lot of the agencies located regionally in 
Community C, so like state work VOAD, our State VOAD, we need to staff our 
state EOC, and we don’t even have a VOAD person that can do that. 
This next quote describes how the majority of the public attention and resources were 
directed to the larger disaster in the region: 
Ninety percent of our resources are up north. And there’s obviously a visible 
need. It’s on TV, it’s on the radio. You can walk down the street and you can see 
the house that is affected, where for us you could walk down the street and you 
couldn’t tell. You couldn’t tell which house was affected and what house wasn’t. I 
think they definitely came to the table. A lot of the national VOADs came to the 
table.” 
When considering disaster competition, one cannot do so without recognizing the other 
barriers and how the collective effect of all three of the factors can cumulatively prevent 
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a LVOAD from developing. In one of the communities that did not officially form, the 
LVOAD was already facing pressures from burnout and meeting fatigue when along 
comes this huge disaster in the region and pulls organizations and resources from their 
community. Suddenly, burnout and meeting fatigue were compounded and enhanced. It is 
unsurprising that the counter pressures outweighed the pressures to create a LVOAD in 
this community. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored answers to this study’s first research question: What factors 
influence the creation of a Local Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster (LVOAD)? 
This study identified hazard event/hazard events, leadership, and the formation of a 
LVOAD organizational structure as factors that seem to have influenced the creation or 
failure to create the LVOADs in this study. This study also found that just as there are 
factors pushing LVOADs towards creation, there are other factors (i.e. burnout, meeting 
fatigue, and disaster competition) that hinder creation. These factors remain significant as 
a LVOAD moves into maintenance as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: LVOAD MAINTENANCE 	  
This chapter reports results related to this study’s second research question: What 
factors facilitate and hinder the maintenance of Local Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster (LVOADs)? Maintenance refers to the activities that are undertaken after the 
LVOAD becomes official that enable the organization to continue functioning. Although 
there were five communities involved in this research, only two communities progressed 
to LVOAD maintenance. Therefore, the data presented in this chapter only reflects data 
from two LVOADs. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section picks up 
where Chapter 4 left off and continues the discussion of counter pressures and introduces 
three additional barriers that arose during LVOAD maintenance. General housekeeping 
issues comprise the second section and include financial management, updated 
information, and regular meetings. The next section is LVOAD evolution and discusses 
the shift to an all hazards approach. The final section is value of membership and 
includes membership recognition and the inclusion of education and training. 	  
Counter Pressures/Barriers 
The two communities that adopted official LVOADs had each dealt with 
repetitive flooding over consecutive years prior to forming a LVOAD and for multiple 
years after officially forming. Therefore, the previous three barriers (i.e. burnout, meeting 
fatigue, and disaster competition, discussed in Chapter 4) continue to exert pressures on 
the LVOAD even after it became official. Adding to these factors and further 
compounding the post-creation environments are three additional barriers: turnover, turf 
issues, and complacency. Although these latter three maintenance barriers were present in 
the pre-creation environment to some extent, participants noted they had greater influence 
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in the post-creation environment. Therefore, all six barriers compounded over time to 
exert significant counter pressures to the maintenance and the continued existence of the 
LVOADs.  
Turnover 
 Turnover simply refers to instances where individuals vacate their positions 
within an organization. In this section, turnover is discussed as it pertains to turnover 
within the LVOAD leadership and across all of the member organizations and associate 
members that comprise the LVOAD. There are a number of factors referenced by 
participants that resulted in turnover. Some individuals willingly vacated their position to 
pursue a different position within their organization. Some left their positions to pursue 
other jobs outside of their organizations. Some individuals left for personal reasons and 
some left due to retirement. Regardless of the reasons, turnover affected LVOAD 
maintenance in a number of ways. Many participants cited turnover as a major problem 
with LVOAD maintenance. One participant exemplified this belief when they said, 
“…another cause of problem(s) is constant turnover of staff.” In general, turnover 
amongst the nonprofit community was commonly cited as a factor with LVOAD 
maintenance. However, not all participants looked at turnover as such a big problem, as 
evidenced by the following excerpt: One participant stated, “…and you still have people 
moving in and out usually from different churches, or hospitals and schools. Those 
people change frequently, but most of the others are regular.” The following excerpt 
further evidenced this belief: 
And one of the things I've learned about non-profits and volunteer organizations 
is, there's a lot of turnover and change in those groups often times. And so, we've 
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lost at least one of those key people, but somebody will always step up to the 
plate and keep that group going. 
Turnover within the LVOAD leadership seemed to have a greater negative impact 
on maintenance than turnover amongst the members and associate members. Both 
LVOADs retained some of the original core group members from the inception of the 
LVOADs in their communities. However, in one of the two communities, the LVOAD 
went through drastic changes in leadership. This first excerpt highlights the impact that 
turnover in leadership had on one LVOAD from the perspective of those replacing 
leadership: 
I kind of took over going to the meetings up there. Well then, what had happened 
is the two people, the [two leadership positions], decided one day it was no 
longer. They just got up and quit. So they needed someone to step in and take 
over as an interim. 
Although the overall impact of turnover was not universally agreed upon, it was a big 
enough concern that one community decided to address turnover in their plans. The 
following excerpt discusses the system one community has in place to combat turnover 
according to their by-laws and how that looks in reality: 
“The way the system is set up, especially with the chair and vice chair, the 
positions are 3-year terms. So you serve as vice chair and you work with the chair 
to learn everything, then you work as the chair and then you are doing 2 things, 
the former chair moves forward to be the past chair and they’re still on the board 
and they’re there to offer historical advice and then you are there to be the 
president and then you have a new vice chair that you are basically training. So, in 
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a perfect world, you are there for 3 years, you get mentored, do the work and then 
you provide historical context and then you are also mentoring in that second step. 
So, there should always be that consistency. What throws us off is when people 
leave their terms early. If they commit to something and then they leave that’s the 
kind of turnover that really interferes with the way the mechanism is supposed to 
work. And we’ve had a lot of turnover… It’s a challenge. In reality, it’s a 
challenge, but in theory, the system is designed to try to protect it. But there’s 
always somebody around willing to help, so it seems to work out.” 
As the above statement highlights, the system they have developed to combat turnover is 
reliant on leaders fulfilling their terms, which can be problematic in the ever changing 
world of nonprofits. Although most participants remained optimistic that someone would 
always be there to take the place of vacated positions, turnover was definitely a factor 
with the two LVOADs in maintenance. It seems that LVOADs were less troubled with 
turnover amongst the member and associate members and more concerned with turnover 
among those in leadership positions. This finding parallels the previous chapter’s 
reporting of the importance of strong leadership in the creation of LVOADs.  
Turf Issues 
Competition among LVOAD member organizations was mentioned as a barrier to 
the maintenance of a LVOAD in two LVOADs. Turf issues should come as no surprise 
given the survivalist nature of nonprofits and their competition for funding and resources 
(Wolf, 1999). In both communities, multiple LVOAD member organizations had similar 
missions and completed similar tasks and activities related to their role in situations 
involving hazard events. Turf issues arose when some organizations struggled with 
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sharing tasks, responsibilities, or recognition with fellow organizations. The following 
excerpts emphasize some of the challenges turf issues had on LVOAD maintenance: 
There [are] little turf battles back and forth, but I don’t think they have undone the 
effectiveness of the organization as a whole. There [are] always some people who 
don’t like how things are being done and wish they were being done differently… 
People want to be recognized and they want their agency to be recognized and 
that is understandable, but you have to look at what is the intent and what is the 
purpose of this group, of these meetings, of these volunteer organizations working 
together? So yeah, people want to be top dog. That can be a challenge. You try to 
make everybody happy if you can, but it’s a challenge. 
You know, um, it's interesting when you are working with different organizations 
that want to.. are used to being.. Oh, how do I put that tactfully?  They would like 
to be the center. So, to bring them in the fold… takes work and we're not 
completely done with that. Because they would like the community and when you 
know your looking for dollars and those kinds of things. If they can...kinda stick 
out, or rise above the group, that is and you've got a lot of personalities and a lot 
of turf… people's turf. And people want to protect their turf. And when you're 
looking for dollars...um, to bring them in and for everybody to be lifted up. You 
know, it's better, but we've got a long ways to go in that. And that's kinda why we 
moved to a neutral place. 
I guess I don't need to name organizations specifically but I think for a couple of 
them it was like, ‘I thought we were doing that?  Well that's our mission?’  ‘Well, 
that's our mission too’ [referring to another unnamed group]. Ok, we get it. It's not 
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about who does the most. Kinda like I said previously; making sure we're not 
missing anybody, so let's knock off the playground games… I think as long as 
you define the roles pretty early on and stick to them, or be open enough to say, 
ok, I really don't need to do this; Maybe I can change and do something else. So, I 
think that really helps as long as they don’t have sorta a ‘founders syndrome’ or 
the territory piece where it's like, ‘this is only mine’ and you're like, ‘ok, 
whatever.”  It's just dealing with people. It's kinda a challenge. 
There [are] a lot of organizations that have been around for a long time, but 
people, organizations, want to be the ones known. We never go it alone. We never 
do. I'm a big believer in teamwork, and collaboration, and working together. But 
people, organizations are looking out for the interests of their organizations. So, to 
break that down and put it into a bigger mix is hard for some. It's not taking 
anything away from one organization, it's just lifting everybody up and not having 
one come out and say, ‘ok, we did all of this.’ 
Although turf issues certainly had some negative impacts on the LVOADs, in some cases 
the relationships that were developed after overcoming the turf issues resulted in stronger 
personal and professional relationships. The following excerpts demonstrate the 
effectiveness of confronting turf battles and how overcoming these issues can result in 
stronger relationships in the long run:  
You know, once we break down that turf stuff, I think we're gonna be in really 
good shape. I do. I think, you know, fortunately we are in the good community, a 
community that works together. And I'm already seeing improvements in that. 
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The first round, the first year there was a little reluctance to share that, what they 
were doing, but then as we got to know each other and work together and saw that 
then it was pretty free, it was a lot better. So it took a year, a year and a half to get 
comfortable, and now I think most of us know each other really well, we’re pretty 
good friends… 
Although turf issues were mentioned as barriers to LVOAD maintenance, it did not 
appear that they had lasting effects on the communities as evidenced by the above 
excerpts. However, because of the limited number of LVOADs that made it to the 
maintenance phase, there is not enough data to be certain. Turf issues could be a much 
bigger problem than is presented here, which is why it would be remiss not to include it 
as a barrier, even though it did not seem to carry much weight in the communities 
researched in this study. 
Disaster Salience 
Disaster salience was another issue within maintenance that was present in both 
LVOADs that made it to official status. In regards to LVOADs, disaster salience refers to 
the overall visibility and attention that a disaster is receiving from potential disaster 
response agencies, financial donors, and resource providers. Disaster salience can be 
assessed at any point, from the moment a disaster first impacts a community to when a 
community concludes final recovery activities. As previously stated, the two 
communities that formed official LVOADs were both impacted by repetitive flooding. 
Both communities experienced years of consecutive flooding but also experienced years 
where they had a reprieve from flooding. Both communities were actually experiencing a 
reprieve from flooding at the time of the interviews. This study showed that as the two 
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communities went long amounts of time between hazard events, the disaster salience in 
the communities decreased and continued to decrease over time. Inversely, as a 
community faced the prospect of impending flooding, the salience increased. Although 
disaster salience was not a barrier in and of itself, participants regularly cited 
complacency, due to low disaster salience, as a routine problem the LVOADs faced with 
maintenance.  
Two terms that came out of the interviews that dealt with complacency were 
“blue sky” and “gray sky” scenarios, which one participant described as, “…the new 
terminology that everybody uses now is in blue-sky situations. Blue-sky is when there is 
no disaster and gray-sky [is when] there is a disaster event.” Disaster salience did not 
seem to be a concern during the gray sky situations since complacency was not 
mentioned as a problem while the flooding was occurring. However, blue-sky situations 
proved to be a very difficult obstacle for the LVOADs to overcome. One participant 
described the connection between blue-sky situations and complacency when they said, 
“We actually went a spring without something really bad, you know, in terms of 
incoming [flooding] again, but... I think there was, perhaps, a lackadaisicalness.” 
One of the common ways that participants discussed complacency was in regards 
to LVOAD meeting attendance. LVOAD leadership felt that LVOAD meeting attendance 
declined when disaster salience was low. The flowing quote was from a LVOAD board 
member discussing the drop in meeting attendance and how that affected how they 
offered trainings: 
Actually, we were looking at offering the training once a year, but as we've met, 
um, and when you're not in disaster it's like our [last] meeting, there were a lot of 
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people that just didn't come. Because we're not on top of a crisis… A lot of times 
people won't show up until you're on top of the disaster. 
This next excerpt was by a member of a governmental organization within the same 
community discussing how blue-sky situations have affected their communication with 
the LVOAD: 
So, of course now this year with no flood, I haven't heard anything from them, 
which is probably just fine with them and probably just fine with me [laughs]. So, 
it's, you know, I get the sense right now that they're not meeting and they're not 
being active because there's really not a mission right now. They have their own 
business to take care of just like I do when there's not a disaster. I have other 
things to do. 
The next quote describes a situation where the community was experiencing a period of 
inactivity and the forecast was predicting possible flooding. The participant described the 
community as preparing for the flooding until the forecast changed and the community 
reverted back to a sense of complacency. This quote also highlights how burnout and 
complacency go hand-in-hand: 
It was right when they thought the [water] was going to be really, really 
high again. And then after the forecast changed that said nothing was going to 
happen, then everybody just decided, ‘ok, guess what, that didn’t happen again. 
I’m tired of trying to be emotionally ready for this, and then it’s not, and then they 
just left. 
This next quote describes complacency setting in and becoming a problem after a full 
year without a hazard event to motivate people to act: 
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Let’s see, we actually ran pretty good for about two years and then last summer 
we had a really dry summer. We had a dry spring and a dry fall. A lot of the 
urgency for help… Everyone was like, ‘hey everyone, we’re doing ok.’ So, we’ve 
actually kind of backed off on our [L]VOAD and haven't done a lot in a while and 
now we are getting a lot of rain again. The [waters] coming up again. 
This next quote sums up the basic problem with disaster complacency and how low 
disaster salience over long periods of time can negatively impact the LVOAD 
maintenance: 
I think it's tough for people to stay engaged and to stay ready. I mean, I think 
there's a sense of complacency that just inevitably will kick in if it hasn't 
happened for a long time. And especially with non-profits when you have people 
that are changing jobs. I mean the average time I would say is probably about 
three to five years and you could go ten years without a flood or a major disaster 
to where you'd need a [LVOAD]. And so, you could have completely new people 
in there that have never experienced a disaster. So, yeah, I think the complacency 
part would be a big potential for danger. I mean, even just the enthusiasm of like, 
‘why are we meeting?  I don't really care, I've got other stuff to do’ [spoken as an 
example, not a personal opinion]. But, you know, it's always interesting when it's 
fresh in your mind. 
The conversation thus far has been limited to situations describing a season without a 
hazard event and a year without a hazard event. One participant discussed potential future 
problems for their LVOAD if their community experienced multiple years without a 
disaster: 
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The only problem I see coming up is if you had two to three years in a row where 
there wasn't really a call. Then you might see where you have to re-ignite the 
troops to come back because they are not really doing much in between. 
The excerpts discussed in this section highlight just how big an influence disaster 
salience has on the maintenance of a LVOAD. Even members of LVOADs, whose basic 
purpose is to deal specifically with disasters, can succumb to complacency produced by 
persistent blue-sky conditions. The two LVOADs that became official did so during 
periods of disaster. Disaster complacency set in when the LVOADs experienced periods 
of sustained “blue-sky” conditions. At the time these words are being written, the 
evidence provided by the two LVOADs that are currently in the maintenance phase 
suggest that after going consecutive years without a hazard event, they are facing 
significant challenges maintaining membership, participation in meetings, contact 
information, updated social media, and overall motivation and interest in LVOAD 
activities. This statement is not meant to discredit the attempts by leadership to maintain 
interest and participation. Evidence also suggests that these LVOADs have attempted a 
number of activities to counteract these obstacles. These attempts fall into three 
categories including general housekeeping activities, which are actions intended to keep 
the LVOADs operational; LVOAD evolution, which are actions designed to grow or 
enhance the LVOAD; and finding value of membership, which gives members a reason 
to participate. The discussion begins with general housekeeping.  
General Housekeeping 
This category includes the factors that contribute to the general day-to-day 
maintenance of a LVOAD. General housekeeping issues include by-law revisions, 
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financial management, updating information, and maintaining regular meetings. 
Housekeeping activities were undertaken by members of the board including the chair, 
vice chair, secretary, treasurer, members-at-large, and interns. Housekeeping activities 
were a very important aspect of maintenance that should not be overlooked. It has already 
been stated previously that LVOAD membership is entirely voluntary and, therefore, all 
housekeeping activities are being undertaken voluntarily as well. This means that 
individuals are expected to complete VOAD tasks and activities on top of their duties to 
their organizations. As discussed within the various sections on barriers, these individuals 
face many obstacles that stand in their way. However, housekeeping activities are not 
designed to address these barriers. Housekeeping activities are undertaken simply to keep 
the LVOAD operational.  
By-Law Revisions 
Since both official LVOADs specifically referenced their importance with 
maintaining, it is fitting that the first housekeeping factor discussed is by-law revisions. 
The by-laws were created and enacted to serve as a guideline for how the LVOAD should 
operate. Both communities had similar by-laws, which were derived from the same 
generic format borrowed from the SVOAD. However, each community had different 
needs, which demanded some changes to the bylaws over time. Both LVOADs reported 
handling revisions in a similar manner. Both mentioned that they held votes to determine 
if and how changes were to be made. Participants stated that revisiting and revising the 
by-laws proved to be an important element of housekeeping. One participant captured the 
general attitude of the process surrounding by-law revisions when they said, “So, it was 
definitely a working document as we went on.” In addition to making the necessary 
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changes as they arose, one community decided to make by-law updates a regular function 
as described in the following statement: “…we needed to redo our by-laws. We needed to 
get them ready for a vote in May. So, looking at the by-laws once a year. Updating them 
once a year…” This last example is perhaps the perfect illustration of how important the 
LVOADs viewed by-law revisions since they wrote by-laws revisions into the by-laws. 
Although neither LVOAD gave a definitive number of times they revisited their by-laws, 
both mentioned that they returned to them several times. 
The reason for starting the housekeeping conversation with by-law revisions is 
because they are also the foundation for some of the other housekeeping factors. To 
varying degrees, the by-laws outline rules and guidelines on how to conduct LVOAD 
activities including deciding who manages finances; when to hold meetings in both blue-
sky and gray-sky situations, how to differentiate between the different types of members, 
how to handle contact information, and who is responsible for what. One of the 
communities even had rules dictating what would happen if the LVOAD decided to 
disband. In some cases, the by-laws were the determining factor when leadership had to 
make decisions that did not require a full member vote. One of the main activities 
outlined in the by-laws was financial management, which is discussed in the next section. 
Financial Management 
Financial management was a factor in both of the LVOADs that reached the 
maintenance phase of LVOAD development. Both of the LVOADs had membership 
dues, which were fees charged to the board members, members-at-large, and regular 
organizational members. The only members that were not expected to pay membership 
dues were the associate members, who were made up of members of government 
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organizations. They used the membership dues for various activities such as professional 
speakers, office supplies, and in one case, to meet an unmet need in the community. The 
membership dues were $25.00 annually for one LVOAD and $20.00 annually for the 
other.  
Dealing with finances brings with it some issues. Decisions needed to be made on 
who would handle the money, who would be able to access the money, and how the 
money would be spent. Both LVOADs addressed this issue in a similar fashion. Both 
LVOADs voted on how money would be spent and the money was kept in a third party 
financial institution. When the money was dispersed, it took the signatures of two board 
members to withdraw the money. The following quote is from one of the communities 
and discusses how the membership dues were used for in their LVOAD: “Membership 
dues are twenty-five dollars a year. Which is fairly inexpensive. And what that's paying 
for is speakers, training. I know we're working on a website, brochures, that type of thing 
as well.” 
Because of the sensitive nature that dealing with finances entails, one community 
developed a plan if the LVOAD were to disband. This next excerpt discusses one 
community’s contingency plan: 
We have an account through [Funding Agency]. And so, the funds go in directly 
to them. They hold it and then when we need it, two officers sign off on a request 
to it and then they will generate so that we can make payment to a speaker. It was 
already voted on and decided on by the group because we talked about it at one of 
the first meetings. Was what do we do if this bunch decides to disband. You 
know, if there's not a need or what do we do. And so, they put that in the bylaws. 
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That if it closes out then the money, because most of these organizations all have 
people that support the [Funding Agency]. So, what will happen is that the 
[Funding Agency] would then get whatever was leftover. They will just assume 
that. And it will be used in some way in the community. 
The other community had a very similar system in place with one major difference. The 
other LVOAD applied for and received a government grant related to disaster recovery. 
The grant brought much more money to the LVOAD than regular membership dues, but 
it also came with some restrictions from the government on how the grant was to be used. 
After much thought, the LVOAD voted to use the grant money on some unmet needs 
within the community. This money was handled separately from the membership dues. 
The following excerpt discusses how this community handled the grant money: 
We also had to branch off a little bit and we used the [Funding Agency] fund as 
our 501C3 for all of our grant stuff. So, they still have our money, so they cut the 
checks whenever we need them. It’s just a matter of bringing an invoice to them. 
And that way it was kind of nice because they took the money control, or at least 
the money responsibility, out of our hands and we have a third party doing that for 
us, which worked nice and we’re really glad the [Funding Agency] fund was 
willing to do that for us. 
Although both LVOADs handled their finances in a similar way, there really is 
not enough evidence to suggest the effectiveness of other options other than using a 
funding agency. The last excerpt did suggest another possibility, which is to become an 
official 501(c)3 nonprofit organization. The general consensus among the participants 
was that their current financial systems were functioning well. However, neither LVOAD 
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had a system in place to strictly enforce gathering membership dues from the members. 
Although both LVOADs had secretaries to handle the money once it was received, 
neither had a system to ensure that all members were making annual payments. This lack 
of payment enforcement was due in large part to problems with up-to-date contact 
information for members and member organizations, which is discussed in greater detail 
in the next section. 
Updated Information 
 An LVOAD is founded on communication, coordination, collaboration, and 
cooperation. In order to achieve these four values, LVOADs rely heavily on maintaining 
updated information. The primary information that needed to be routinely updated was 
contact information for members and associate members. The contact information was 
regularly used to update members and associate members on general LVOAD activity 
including when the meetings were to be held, what topics were going to be discussed, 
who would be presenting or speaking, meeting minutes after meetings, updates on 
nonprofit activities, and updates on government activities. If the information is outdated 
then members and associate members are not getting the information on LVOAD 
activities, which can lead to loss of membership.  
The main reason information was outdated was turnover of members. All 
participants (N=17) listed the primary means of communicating across all of the 
organizations in this study was email, with secondary being telephone. When individuals 
departed from their organizations, the LVOAD was often not informed, which resulted in 
the loss of both that member’s contact information as well as the contact information 
within the member’s organization. In addition, members who move laterally within their 
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organizations often changed their contact information when they assumed their new 
positions. Some individuals and organizations change their emails or phone numbers 
entirely for various personal or professional reasons.  
Regardless of the cause, both LVOADs had major difficulties maintaining 
updated contact information. The following quote highlights a fundamental maintenance 
problem concerning updated information: 
When I came in, our membership list was really kind of…  It hadn't been taken 
care of. I almost say that our membership has decreased, only because until the 
last four months we hadn't been keeping up with, who were the right contacts and 
who were the people that we should be talking to. And what we discovered was 
that some of those contacts no longer worked in the right places or we had bad 
information for them. So I think we are doing a better job and moving forward 
and hopefully that local involvement will increase… So, hopefully our attendance 
and our membership will increase, but I think the reality is that it has decreased 
because we did such a poor job managing the membership roster, over the last 
year and a half. 
Having served in an internship capacity within a LVOAD, this researcher can attest to the 
difficulty with updating and maintaining contact information. Several hours can be spent 
entirely on updating contact information. In addition, individuals varied as to how often 
they would check and respond to their emails. Of course, there were also individuals who 
simply do not answer phone calls or emails from people they do not know, which was a 
problem when leadership changed within the LVOAD and a new individual was tasked 
with contacting these individuals.  
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In addition to maintaining updated contact information, other forms of 
communication were also attempted by the two LVOADs. A website and a Facebook 
page were two attempts that the LVOADs made at trying their hands in social media. 
Both LVOADs attempted a Facebook page and one created a website, although the 
Facebook page and website would seemingly be valuable forms of communication in 
today’s technological times. However, technology is just another form of information that 
needs to be routinely updated and maintained in order to be useful, an issue with which 
both LVOADs struggled. This next quote discusses attempts of the LVOAD at 
maintaining an updated website and how important it is to have updated information: 
And then, I’m sure you’re aware, it was after a year or so and then we had the 
website, that kind of died a little bit, and that’s reviving back. And that, you 
know, using a website or Facebook, that is so dependent on do you have fresh 
information to put on there, and when you don’t, and it’s kind of hard to keep that 
useful. 
These next two excerpts discuss problems with their respective Facebook pages: 
There’s not a lot on there. We were hoping that we could use that and people that 
were already a part of the VOAD would go and make sure they “Liked” that page 
and we would use that for updates but I think that we got only like 4 likes on it, an 
one of them was me, one was [the chair]. So, that didn’t really work out so we 
went and we set up an email account through Gmail. 
Right now it’s pretty informal. We have an email list. We’re trying to come up 
with a list serve or something more formal. There is a Facebook page, but it got 5 
likes on it. So I think it will build, but right now, it’s just email. That seems to be 
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the way that we communicate with everybody and like I mentioned we use 
quarterly meetings so we do get a bunch of people who show up and we do 
communicate then. 
This next quote reiterates the problems associated with email and websites and the 
importance of maintaining new and fresh information to keep people interested in the 
LVOAD: 
You just need your Chair, Co-Chair, Treasurer, and such to be willing to keep the 
energy going, to keep people excited, to keep it fresh. Even if you just put 
something new every month up on the website or an email, just to keep fresh 
ideas there. So, that we remember to stay in contact. That helps! 
It is clear that giving and receiving updated information for member and associate 
members is a real concern, but it is less clear how large of an impact that outdated 
information has on a LVOAD. The data suggests that leadership considers it a important 
issue, but the LVOADs also reported that some forms of communication were largely 
unsuccessful as evidenced by the attempts to maintain a Facebook page. Both LVOADs 
mentioned that they only had “4” and “5” “Likes” respectively. Likewise, although fresh 
and updated information was referenced as important, it was a difficult factor to measure. 
Although neither LVOAD appeared to successfully maintain either a Facebook page or a 
website, it is not clear that they would have met with more success had they contained 
more current or up-to-date information. One community had an intern to update 
information and create a marketing plan, which included creating a temporary logo, 
Facebook page, and updated website. However, the creation of a temporary logo, an 
updated website, and Facebook page did not appear to receive any more attention. 
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In addition to updated contact information and social media, one LVOAD also 
made attempts to gather information on the resources of members and associate 
members. Members were asked to fill out a sheet of paper asking about what types of 
resources they might have to offer in times of disaster. This information was used by the 
LVOAD to get an understanding of who to call for specific needs should a disaster occur. 
Some examples of these types of resources were hygiene items, shelter, clothing, food, 
water, first aid supplies, cleanup kits, case management, and spiritual support, to name a 
few. This information was compiled into a resource binder, which displayed the resources 
of all member organizations. This allowed the LVOAD to better coordinate between 
member organizations in times of disaster. None of the member organizations were in 
any way obligated to use their resources on behalf of the LVOAD or to act in any way on 
behalf of the LVOAD. The resource list was simply used to help the LVOAD if they 
were trying to put organizations in touch with each other to expedite the process in the 
event of a disaster. It is unclear if the resource list will be helpful for the LVOAD long-
term, but it was another source of information that needed to be updated. With all of this 
updating, it should be apparent that there is a lot of time involved with keeping 
information up-to-date. One way that LVOADs dealt with the issue of time was with a 
student intern, which is discussed in the next section.  
Interns 
It is clear that maintaining updated information was a serious problem, but the 
LVOADs were not without tools. One of these tools involved utilizing interns from local 
universities. The two communities that became official LVOADs reported having interns 
that were able to devote their time to issues that they may not have had time to address on 
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their own time. In one community, the intern took on duties including updating contact 
information, maintaining a resource inventory, and developing a social media plan. In an 
organization made up entirely of people donating their time and energy on top of their 
other duties within their organizations, they have limited time to engage in these types of 
activities. So, an intern can be helpful with completing some of those time consuming 
tasks, which is discussed in the following excerpts: 
One of the challenges is that, at least right now, when you look at the folks who 
are managing the VOAD, we all have critical roles to play in disasters response so 
that internship position is really nice because it allows somebody who can focus 
just on the VOAD while I’m doing my duties with the [Organization X] and 
[Name A] is doing her duty as [Organization Y]. Plus this is a volunteer position 
and as passionate as I may be about this I still have a finite amount of time that I 
can devote to this and having someone that has 20 or 30 or 40 hours depending on 
their internship program that can focus on this really allows for a lot of headway 
to be done. And the other thing that an intern has the capacity to do is spend time 
thinking about the cool things we could do. I’ll use an example here at the 
[Organization X], we had an intern, because they have the time and the skills and 
the expertise, we are developing a Google Earth program that itemizes where all 
of our resources are, where our shelters are, where our logistical materials are, so 
in a glance we can open up Google Earth and look at these balloons that pop up 
with contact information, that is a pretty swift system. But I certainly don’t have 
the time to do all that data entry by myself because I have day-to-day 
responsibilities, so in a [L]VOAD situation that’s exactly the type of value that an 
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intern brings in. They have the unburdened time that they can commit to the 
organization, so I think that interns, those folks are incredibly important and I’d 
love to keep them around. 
...but that’s the kind of capacity that an intern brings to us, because, in theory, an 
intern is a college student who is younger, has more experience in whatever the 
new technology is that’s out today, and hopefully has the excitement and the drive 
to really dive in into something that maybe some of us are jaded and we are just 
worried about doing the day to day stuff. It’s a breath of fresh air that comes in 
with some of these folks. 
 The intern working with the other community had a much narrower job and dealt 
specifically with issues surrounding their by-laws, which is discussed in the following 
quote: “When we started everything we had a [Student] here that was working on her 
[University Education]. And she really took on the by-laws as her priority and really ran 
with it and she did a wonderful job.” As evidenced by the above citations, having an 
intern with “unburdened time” was beneficial and both LVOADs were able to use interns 
their advantage. 
Meetings/Participation 
 When it comes to meetings, evidence suggests that meetings have a tremendous 
impact on the success of the LVOAD. The two LVOADs had similar meeting schedules, 
which were written into their by-laws dictating quarterly meetings during “blue-sky” 
scenarios and more frequent meetings during “grey-sky” scenarios. At the time this 
research was conducted, both LVOADs were experiencing “blue-sky” conditions. 
However, one LVOAD had not met for several months and had no plan to meet and the 
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other was attempting to maintain the scheduled quarterly meetings outlined in their by-
laws, but was having problems maintaining attendance from members and associate 
members. One participant described the issue of declining membership when they said, 
“…the first meeting there was probably twenty people that showed up. The second 
meeting three, and then by the last meeting two. So, there’s been nobody to show up…” 
The following quote describes the lack of participation by members and associate 
members: 
One of the things we often see after a large disaster is you have a large pool of 
people who attend the meetings and then as time goes on individuals step back 
because they don’t have a response anymore. They don’t have an active role. Or 
they’re tired of it and they want to move on in life. 
Although participation by regular members is certainly an important factor with 
LVOAD maintenance, associate members play a slightly different role. Members from 
the nonprofit community join a LVOAD to enhance communication, coordination, 
cooperation, and collaboration with each other. Associate members from government 
organizations supply information to the LVOAD. Examples of the type of information 
that may come from government include where the needs are, what government services 
are available to individuals, what money is available for individuals, and how to enroll in 
government assistance programs to name a few. This next excerpt describes the impact 
that government absence can have on the LVOAD: 
This year is going to be interesting because we have set up so we will have 
quarterly meetings. And that was how they first set it up with the by-laws so that 
people would still stay connected and it wouldn't just be one main crisis and then 
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they wouldn't see one another again. They wanted to facilitate that 
communication to keep happening. And so, this is really the first year now where 
we’re actively going to be doing the quarterly meetings. And so, we’re still on 
that learning curve with it. I've noticed that with the first one, that [emergency 
managers weren’t] around at all and their presence was missed. Their presence 
was missed. What we did actually with the board before January is we looked at 
the calendar and we have set this years meetings already so that people could get 
it on their calendar. And hopefully that will help to facilitate a little bit. So the 
next one now will be coming up in May. And so, we'll see what happens. We'll 
see what happens. 
In some cases, the meetings themselves can impact the maintenance of the LVOAD. 
When one considers barriers such as burnout and meeting fatigue, it is easy to see how 
having meetings too frequently could negatively impact participation. This next quote 
discusses the decision to move to quarterly meetings: 
I usually knew about it 3 weeks in advance, and then they tried to have it, I think 
it was the fourth, either the second or the fourth Thursday of every month. They 
did it for a while and then they decided to make it every four months, because 
they were meeting awhile there every month and that was too much. So I know 
right when I started they were switching how often they were going to meet. But 
yes, it was usually scheduled pretty far in advance. 
The focus thus far has been on participation in meetings and has not yet touched 
on the quality of the meetings. The quality of the meetings was discussed as an important 
factor in LVOAD maintenance. In regards to quality, one participant stated, “Don’t meet 
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just to meet. Have a teachable moment.” Although having a “teachable moment” is 
undoubtedly good advice, it is certainly not the only consideration when it comes to 
participation. As has already been discussed with meeting fatigue, individuals go to 
several meetings and hear a lot of the same information regurgitated. If the information is 
stale and members are not learning anything at the meetings, it is more likely they will 
not continue to participate in meetings. Although much responsibility for participating in 
meetings lies in the individuals themselves, the LVOAD leadership is not without 
responsibility. This next quote touches upon how leadership fits into the participation 
equation: 
…I think the participants who go will probably still continue to go. And I guess I 
should say that if they go, it’s going to be directly tied to how well the leadership 
is doing, because in a time of disaster everyone is really busy and if they are 
taking the time to come to this meeting daily or weekly, there has to be a value in 
being here. So if we, as leadership, aren’t creating a good conduit for information, 
or bringing the right speakers to provide the information that they need, or just 
don’t have a plan at all, you know either through social media or just electronic 
media or even print media in terms of newsletters to communicate what is 
available and when the meetings are and who is going to be there, I think people 
will stop coming. 
Unfortunately, there is no quick and easy solution outlining how to maintain active 
participation in a LVOAD, but it is up to leadership to continue to present new and 
pertinent information to keep members interested in attending the meetings. 
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LVOAD Evolution 
LVOAD evolution is somewhat different than the housekeeping factors 
previously discussed in that it focuses on factors that are seen as progressing and 
advancing the LVOAD, rather than simply maintaining it. There are a number of factors 
in this section that can be seen as expanding factors that are taking the LVOAD in 
directions beyond those that simply maintain the current state. Whereas the housekeeping 
factors are really designed just to keep the LVOAD functioning at a very basic level, 
evolving factors are an active attempt by the LVOAD to address problems dealing with 
some of the barriers, such as burnout and complacency. The first evolutionary factor 
discussed here is the movement from a focus on a single hazard, which was 
predominately flooding in these communities, to an all-hazard mindset. 
All-Hazard Shift 
As previously discussed, the only hazard that all five of the communities faced 
was flooding. Therefore, the act of shifting the focus from one hazard to an all-hazards 
approach can be viewed as an evolution of the original LVOAD idea. This shift is 
important for a couple reasons. By shifting focus to other hazards, it shifts the LVOAD 
members focus from reacting to flooding to preparing for other hazards such as tornadoes 
and wildfires, which are two other common hazards in FEMA Region VIII. Also, it opens 
opportunities for the LVOAD to expand and introduce fresh information in the meetings, 
which could potentially help combat issues such as burnout and complacency.  
In both communities that became official LVOADs, there was a desire to become 
more organized and to grow and expand to include education and trainings for other 
hazards when not facing times of flooding. One participant highlighted this desire when 
they said, “It's also giving us an opportunity to get more organized and know that there's 
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a lot more out there than just flooding. And to be able to offer some of that other training 
to people.” This statement was echoed by another participant who said, “That was the 
desire was how do we bring all of the community to be vested the way that we have been 
in [Year X] and [Year Y]. Not just in flooding, but in other disasters too.” Another 
participant discussed the opportunity for growth when they said, “We are focusing on 
other disasters. We, um, the executive board set meeting(s) for the year. We have a good 
game plan. We’re growing.” 
The general attitude of participants in both communities was that they had been 
dealing with flooding for a number of years and they were burned out with responding to 
flooding, highlighted in the burnout section in Chapter 4. Both communities mentioned 
using other hazards as a way to better prepare their communities for other hazard events 
as evidenced by the following statement: “So, it's an opportunity for all of us to get 
together to say, alright, how are we staying current if there's a tornado. How are we going 
to respond?” Another participant provided further support when they stated, “If it does 
become a dry year, one of the suggestions that came for August was doing stuff with 
fires. Brushfires, and field fires, and whatnot.” The all-hazard evolution was further 
supported in the following excerpt: 
The pattern is a little different this year then what we've been seeing. And so, we 
know that to the south of us there's been a lot of tornado activity already. I mean, 
who thought of tornadoes in February?  Really, for the northern area and the 
Midwest. But we've had a lot of them. So we have a strong potential for that. And 
so, we're going to be doing some tornado work at the next meeting. 
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One community went as far as to incorporate responding to other hazards into their plans, 
as evidenced by the following excerpt: 
We are going to continue having regular quarterly meetings in Blue Sky scenarios 
and if a disaster strikes, in a Gray Sky scenario, we will have them as frequently 
as needed, so in the flood event, once a week seemed to be ok. In a tornado event, 
we may have them as frequently as every day, so it will depend on what the event 
is. 
The quotes highlighted above show some of the reasons why the LVOADs were 
evolving to an all-hazards approach. The evidence suggests LVOADs made the all-
hazards shift because they desired greater organization and wanted to be better prepared 
for scenarios other than flooding, which they felt they had a firm understanding. It is also 
worth mentioning that during the interview process, there was genuine excitement when 
the participants were talking about shifting focus to other hazards. It was clear that 
dealing with flooding year after year had caused some burnout within the LVOAD 
leadership and the all-hazard approach to disasters seemed to help alleviate some of that 
burnout. Participants also felt that incorporating other hazards into the plans and meetings 
was a way to deal with the complacency during blue-sky situations. One community also 
brought up a concept that addresses this issue more directly with what they referred to as 
providing value to membership, which is discussed in the next section. 
Value of Membership 
Another factor that was uncovered as important to the maintenance of a LVOAD 
is the value of membership. Value of membership is when the LVOAD leadership is 
seeking ways that the LVOAD can offer value for members to participate in LVOAD 
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meetings, trainings, and other activities. Although both LVOADs attempted to offer value 
in participation, it was a concept that was far more developed in one of the two LVOADs. 
One participant described value of membership in its simplest sense when they stated, “If 
we are going to take money from someone, but we are going to provide the same 
information to everybody regardless of whether or not they are a member; what is really 
the true value of membership?” 
The annual dues for each LVOAD were $25 and $20 respectively for each of the 
LVOADs. The participant brings up a very valuable point. Although it is not a large sum 
of money, why would individuals pay for a free service? In order for the LVOAD to 
continue, and perhaps even thrive, one LVOAD felt it was imperative that members 
receive value for participation and attending meetings in both blue-sky and grey-sky 
situations. In addition to the monetary reasons, the LVOADs also noted that providing 
value with membership was a way to deal with barriers such as complacency, meeting 
fatigue, and turf issues. Recognizing member organizations and offering educational and 
training opportunities in the form of workshops and professional speakers were pointed to 
as the primary mechanisms for bringing value to membership.  
Member Recognition 
 The first factor discussed in this section is member recognition. As previously 
discussed, if members are expected to pay money to be a part of the LVOAD, they need 
to be receiving something in return. One way the LVOADs addressed this issue was 
through recognition. As discussed in the section titled turf issues, a lack of recognition 
can be a major barrier to the maintenance of a LVOAD. Participants noted that receiving 
recognition provided LVOAD members with a sense of value. As one participant put it, 
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“So the nice thing about this VOAD, everybody is lifted up; everybody is recognized.” 
The following excerpts provide further evidence of how recognition can contribute value 
to membership: 
Um, once we started having these weekly meetings, people started talking. You 
know, you get in a bad enough crisis and you can only go so far and there’s only 
so many people. So, that is something I’ve seen improved. They’ve only been 
doing that for a couple of years now. So, that’s really awesome and that’s working 
together and not being threatened by each other’s organization. They both provide 
valuable services. Um, to people in need and that’s what you lift them both up. 
Lift everybody up. And being a part of the VOAD, everybody's lifted up. You 
know volunteers come from all over in time of disaster. Our faith-based 
organizations come in and the things that they do for us. Unbelievable!  I had no 
clue. I really believe in lifting those people up. I just do, because of the 
tremendous job that they’re doing. 
The recognition described in the above excerpts was not a part of a formal 
recognition process. The participants referred to the general recognition they received 
from other members of the nonprofit community, emergency managers, and other 
government officials, rather than being recognized by individuals within the community 
or by media outlets. Although recognition was noted as a maintenance factor in both 
official LVOADs, one appeared to make greater efforts to ensure that members were 
being recognized and given the opportunity to speak during the meetings. In addition to 
recognizing members, the next section discusses how education and training 
opportunities were another way that LVOADs provided value to membership. 
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Education and Training Opportunities 
The most commonly referenced factor that provided value to its members was 
offering guest speakers, educational opportunities, and disaster workshops. These types 
of opportunities were a factor in both communities that became official LVOADs. The 
guest speakers ranged from local community partners to professional speakers. The 
educational and trainings ranged on topics from how to build a disaster kit to how to 
muck out a house. Participants generally noted that education and training opportunities 
were an excellent way to provide value for member organizations, but the quality of the 
training was noted as a concern in both communities. Participation seemed to be 
contingent on the salience of the subject matter presented in the training opportunities 
and workshops. The training event described in the following quote is indicative of those 
generally perceived as valuable to the participants: 
They, [Professional Disaster Response and Recovery Organization] came and 
provided a nice training for us last year… What they did was they offered training 
on how to do [mucking houses]; The right way to do it. They brought, they got a 
couple of trailers that are completely supplied with everything that is needed. 
They actually travel the country. 
Although both LVOADs noted the value of professional speakers, both communities also 
noted that education and trainings were met with mixed results. Some training workshops 
were very well attended while others had very low participation. This next excerpt 
discusses this predicament the LVOADs faced: 
I guess they had the [member organization] got ahold of somebody that came in 
and showed us all how to use those sanitizing kits and had like a seminar. They 
had like a wall that said, ‘this is how you can do it and this, and this’ and I guess 
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they had like 30-some people show up for it, and then they tried to set up another 
one and I don’t know if it just didn’t get completed. I think this was like a month 
before I started. It just didn’t get completed, or something had come up and then it 
just never went any further. So as far as I know, they had the big one turnout… 
Although the premise behind speakers was generally well received by both 
LVOADs, participants noted the importance of having speakers that were relevant to the 
target audience. This next excerpt shows the importance of having a topic that resonates 
with the intended demographic: 
We had [a guest speaker who] came in and spoke about tornado safety and the 
warning system, things you could do, and that was pretty good, that was a good 
one. We did have one that we tried a meeting; we paid a speaker to come in to 
help us work better as a team and communicate with each other, and that, you 
know, we had like ten people, so I guess they weren’t interested in that, but 
everything else has been pretty well. 
This next excerpt discusses the how salience affected the participation in meetings and 
how they attempted to confront the problem by bringing in speakers and workshops: 
Actually, we were looking at offering the training once a year, but as we've met, 
um, and when you're not in disaster it's like our [Month X] meeting, there were a 
lot of people that just didn't come. Because we're not on top of a crisis. So, we are 
going to offer programming each quarter. Um, and the educational piece to make 
it worth people's time. A lot of times people won't show up until you're on top of 
the disaster. We want people to show up, get to know each other, so when a 
disaster happens you know who you're asking for help. You know who you're 
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dealing with. So, I think the programming, bringing in speakers on a regular basis, 
um, and there are many different disasters, so I think we're good for awhile 
(laugh). I think we'll help bring people to the table. 
In addition to scheduling the meeting at a date and time that was accessible to the 
member organizations, participants noted the topic for the training needed to be geared 
towards the members. In some cases, the trainings were not appropriate subjects for the 
member organizations. This final excerpt discusses the relevance of the meeting topic and 
how they need to be catered to the disaster agency demographic: 
Prior to my coming, they were, the meetings seemed to be very random and they 
may even be stuff everybody knows like, what should be in an emergency kit? 
That’s a great topic, but I think that most of us, at least in our professions and we 
already know what that is. So this has come up in our conversations during the 
strategic meetings. When we offer training or speaker series, what is it what those 
individuals really need to know? And how would it interface best with the 
[L]VOAD and their organizations. What we have kind of decided is that it’s not 
the [L]VOAD’s place to instruct people how to be prepared, or how to build a 
strategic plan for their organization. 
It is clear that professional speakers, disaster related trainings, and workshops 
have great potential to provide value with membership, as evidenced by the high turnout 
for certain types of trainings and speakers. However, it is less clear how often these 
trainings and workshops should be offered. Although educational and training 
opportunities were offered in both LVOADs that were in maintenance, one community 
had far more experience than the other with trainings and speakers. In general, the 
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professional speakers, trainings, and educational opportunities were highly regarded as 
important to the successful maintenance by both LVOAD members. 
Conclusion 
This chapter reported the factors found to facilitate and hinder the maintenance of 
the LVOADs in this study. Turnover, turf issues, and disaster salience were revealed as 
barriers to maintaining a LVOAD. Yet, LVOADs undertook three categories of activity 
to attempt to counteract these barriers. These three factors were general housekeeping, 
LVOAD evolution, and providing value of membership. The next chapter will discuss 
how these categories and factors fit together and the implications these findings have for 
future researchers and practitioners. 	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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 	  
Chapter Six discusses the implications of this study in four sections. The first 
section revisits the context surrounding the need for Local Voluntary Organizations 
Active in Disaster (LVOADs). The second section discusses the findings and 
implications they have for the development of future LVOADs. The third section 
discusses the limitations and caveats involved with research on Local Voluntary 
Organization Active in Disaster (LVOADs). The fourth section discusses implications of 
this research for emergency management practice and the academic discipline. 
Return to Context 
 Disasters are nonroutine, disruptive events that overwhelm the capacity of 
communities to respond and recover (Auf der Heide, 1989; Fritz, 1961; Quarantelli, 
1998). When communities are impacted by hazard events, they often turn to the 
government for assistance (Auf der Heide, 1989; Hoetmer, 1991). Although this may 
seem like an easy task, it is far more complicated in reality. The community must first 
approach their local and state jurisdictions for assistance (Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011; 
Sylves, 2008). If the disaster is beyond the state’s capabilities, then the governor can 
request assistance from the federal government (Sylves, 2008). The federal government 
then makes the decision to either offer assistance or deny assistance (Phillips, 2009; 
Smith, 2011; Sylves, 2008). If the government denies assistance, it is up to the local 
government to respond (Alesch, Arendt, & Holly, 2008; Klindt, 2010; Ward & Wamsley, 
2007).  
If the government offers assistance, they are very limited with the types and 
amount of assistance they can provide (Drabek, 1983; 1985; 1987; Drabek et al, 1981; 
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Dynes, 1970; Kennedy et al., 1969; Quarantelli, Dynes, & Haas, 1966; Quarantelli & 
Dynes, 1977; Stallings, 1978). Most assistance is in the form of Public Assistance (PA), 
which is intended to rebuild infrastructure rather than to help individuals (Freemont-
Smith, Boris, & Steurle, 2006; Phillips, 2009; Smith, 2011, Sylves, 2008). If a 
community qualifies, they may be eligible for Individual Assistance (IA) (Phillips, 2009; 
Smith, 2011, Sylves, 2008). Even in the event that IA is awarded to a community, the 
assistance first goes through a rigid process to determine if the individual qualifies 
(FEMA, 2008). If the individuals do not qualify for IA, then they are left on their own to 
recover (Cherry & Cherry, 1997; McDonnell et al., 1995; Morrow, 2000; Phillips, 2009; 
Zarkour & Harrell, 2003). If the individual qualifies for IA, the process may take a long 
time before they see it and it is usually insufficient for meeting individual’s/household’s 
needs (Cherry & Cherry, 1997; McDonnell et al., 1995; Morrow, 2000; Phillips, 2009; 
Zarkour & Harrell, 2003). In short, the governmental response to hazard events in the 
United States is insufficient to meet the needs of individuals/households impacted by 
hazard events (Cherry & Cherry, 1997; Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004; Liu, 2010; 
Norris-Tirrell & Clay, 2006; Smith, 2011; Waugh & Hy, 1990). This drawback of the 
current system leaves several gaps in assistance to individuals and households (Cherry & 
Cherry, 1997; McDonnell et al., 1995; Morrow, 2000; Phillips, 2009; Zarkour & Harrell, 
2003). To help fill these gaps, communities rely on nonprofit organizations among other 
entities (Egan & Tischler, 2010; Kapucu, 2003, 2007, Kapucu, Yuldashev, & Feldheim, 
2011). 
 Throughout the history of the United States, nonprofit organizations have always 
played a valuable role responding to natural and manmade disasters (Kreps, 1990; Pipa, 
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2006; Rubin, 2007). Nonprofit organizations were providing invaluable goods and 
services to individuals in need before the government got involved with disaster relief 
(Kreps, 1990; Pipa, 2006; Rubin, 2007). The problem was that these organizations were 
not coordinating their efforts, which resulted in a lot of duplication of effort and 
unnecessary waste (Smith, 2012; Sylves, 2008). This problem came to light in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Camille when the nonprofit community at the time led a 
disorganized and reactive response (Egan & Tischler, 2010; Simpson, 1998; Smith, 
2011). This led to the establishment of the National Voluntary Organization Active in 
Disaster (NVOAD) in 1970, which formed to resolve these issues (Egan & Tischler, 
2010; Simpson, 1998; National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.). 
 The goals of the NVOAD were to share information and resources to better 
communicate, collaborate, cooperate, and coordinate the response effort (Egan & 
Tischler, 2010; National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.). The perceived 
success of NVOAD led to the creation of State Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster (SVOADs) (Egan & Tischler, 2010; National Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster, n.d.). SVOAD mirror the goals, mission, and structure of NVOAD and currently 
have representation in all 50 states (Egan & Tischler, 2010; National Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.). Although the outgrowth of SVOADs from 
NVOADs was a step in the right direction, there was still an element that had not been 
addressed. Disasters occur locally and are handled largely by local organizations (Hy & 
Waugh, 1990; Sylves, 2008; Waugh, 2000).  
Although few would argue that NVOAD has reduced duplication of effort for the 
large-scale disasters, there are far more small-scale events that go unnoticed. Similarly, 
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SVOAD has likely increased communication, collaboration, cooperation, and 
coordination across the statewide disaster organizations, but still most nonprofit 
organizations and communities do not have representation on SVOADs. Over the past 
few years, Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOADs) have been 
created as a remedy for local level hazard events.  
In addition to local need, the upsurge of LVOADs stems from problems within 
coordination across the local organizations in response to disasters (Pipa, 2006; Smith, 
2012). Prior to the formation of LVOADs, response and recovery were handled with ad 
hoc committees and loosely knit relationships. LVOADs were created to strengthen 
relationships into a formal network founded on the 4 Cs (i.e. communication, 
coordination, collaboration, cooperation) (National Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disaster, n.d.). This study aimed to explore the factors that lead to successful LVOAD 
creation and identify the barriers that impede creation. Although LVOADs certainly have 
a number of benefits, this study also uncovered a number of barriers to the creation and 
maintenance of LVOADs, which are discussed in the next section. 
Exploring the Findings 
 This study sought to explore the factors that influence the creation and 
maintenance of Local Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOADs). For a 
visualization of the process leading to the creation and maintenance of an LVOAD, see 
Figure 1. As the table illustrates, LVOADs in this study formed when the impact of a 
hazard event or series of hazard events created a number of needs/unmet needs within the 
communites. The hazard event(s) was followed by the manifestation of leadership roles 
within the community including external support, a motivated individual, and a core 
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group of committed individuals. The LVOAD organizational structure was the next step 
in the creation process and included by-law formation, elections, and organizational 
recruitment. This was the stage when participants felt the LVOAD became official, which 
signified the moment that the LVOAD entered into the maintenance phase. Maintenance 
was typified by the LVOAD engaging in housekeeping activities, evolutionary actions, 
and seeking value of membership. 
 
 
Figure 1. Process of LVOAD creation and maintenance. 
As had been previously noted, the success of the Local Voluntary Organization 
Active in Disaster (LVOAD) in this study were largely dependent upon the balance 
between the factors encouraging and thwarting development of a LVOAD. These 
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opposing forces are highlighted by the relationship between the factors leading to 
creation and maintenance versus the barrier factors. These pressures and counter-
pressures were apparent throughout the life of the LVOAD from the inception of the 
LVOAD idea within the community, to the creation of an official LVOAD, and into 
LVOAD maintenance. This concept is fundamental to understanding LVOADs. The 
findings of this study suggest that LVOADs cannot exist without some degree of 
pressure. 
In keeping with the principles of grounded theory, this study developed the model 
outlining the process of LVOAD creation and maintenance (See Figure 1) before seeking 
a goodness-of-fit with other models. Several models were examined post-data collection, 
but none quite captured the uniqueness of LVOAD formation. Within the emergency 
management literature, the Disaster Research Center developed a typology of the four 
types of groups that emerge in times of disaster (e.g., Quarantelli, 1977). Although the 
model provides a basic understanding of where emergent groups, such as LVOADs, fit 
into the overall scheme of disaster response, it does not provide enough detail to fit with 
the model illustrated in Figure 1.  
Kreps and Bosworth (2007) created the DTRA model, which considered the role 
domain (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities (A) play in regards to organized 
response to disasters. While	  the	  DTRA	  model	  does	  support	  that	  LVOADs	  are	  a	  good	  potential	  thing	  by	  suggesting	  that	  disaster	  response	  is	  more	  organized	  when	  domains	  and	  tasks	  are	  determined	  pre-­‐disaster	  and	  resources	  and	  activities	  applied	  post-­‐disaster,	  the	  model	  does	  not	  offer	  insight	  into	  what	  factors	  drive	  the	  process	  of	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LVOAD	  creation.	  The	  DTRA	  model	  also	  lacks	  explanation	  for	  how	  these	  groups	  maintain	  between	  disasters. 
When expanding the search beyond emergency management literature and into 
the realm of sociology, the concept of coalition formation stood out as one with the 
potential to fit with the process of LVOAD creation and maintenance. In particular, 
coalition formation offers a greater understanding of what motivates individuals to 
become LVOAD leaders, members of the LVOAD core group, LVOAD members, 
associate members, and partner organizations by examining group phenomenon and 
group formation in general (Gamson, 1961; Lawler & Youngs, 1975). Although coalition 
formation research may offer valuable insight into what drives individuals, particularly 
what motivates individuals to pursue LVOAD development, it does not fit with the figure 
introduced in this research because it lacks the specifics to explain the broader context of 
LVOAD development.  
A search of group formation in anthropology yielded similar results. Hoffman 
(1999) captured the tiered and cyclical nature of LVOAD development with her 
discussion of the three phases of recovery from a disaster: the crisis, the aftermath nexus, 
and the passage to closure. Hoffman’s (1999) model captures some of the challenges the 
individual faces when forming a disaster-related group such as burnout, motivation, and 
value of membership. However, the model is focused on the individual and does not offer 
the insight into the group process necessary to understanding LVOAD formation and 
maintenance. Although each model discussed here offered insight into some of the 
factors discussed in this research, none provided a specific enough model to capture the 
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uniqueness of LVOAD formation. Therefore, an effort was made to find a model that fits 
with the process of LVOAD creation and maintenance and none could be found.  
Time 
Although Figure 1 outlines the process of LVOAD development, it leaves out an 
important factor in need of consideration. This factor is time. Time proved to be an 
elusive factor as it was most certainly influential with the creation and maintenance of 
LVOADs, yet not clear or tangible enough to constitute its own factor. Time was evident 
by participants referencing the days, weeks, months, and years following the hazard 
event(s) in their communities. Time was a difficult factor to measure due to a variety of 
reasons. One reason was the reliance on participant’s memories to recall timeframes and 
timelines. Participants often gave different timelines regarding when the LVOADs 
officially formed, when specific events occurred, and when the different individuals and 
organizations joined, to name a few examples.  
There was also a large degree of variance across the LVOADs. In three 
communities, participants were asked to recall events spanning a year or two. In the other 
two communities, participants had to recall dates and timelines from years prior to the 
interviews. These inconsistencies made it difficult to measure approximate times that the 
LVOADs spent within each stage. For example, it was difficult to distinguish if more or 
less time was spent in the hazard event stage versus the leadership stage or LVOAD 
organizational structure stage. The maintenance phase was the one exception as the by-
laws were commonly referred to as the point at which the LVOAD became official. 
Therefore, all events following by-law creation were within the maintenance stage.  
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The effect of time was perhaps most evident in regards to the amount of time 
between hazard events. The fact that multiple hazard events seemed to play such a major 
factor with LVOAD creation brings up another related element, which was not discussed 
in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. The findings of this study suggest that LVOAD 
creation was most successful with less time between hazard events, even while multiple 
participants mentioned needing or desiring a season off and there was evidence to suggest 
that communities needed time between hazard events to develop their LVOAD. Add in 
barriers such as burnout and meeting fatigue and it becomes even less clear what role 
time played in the creation and maintenance of a LVOAD. Perhaps time can best be 
understood as a dynamic component existent in all factors. Time is continually passing by 
and affecting the creation and maintenance of LVOADs to varying degrees in the days, 
weeks, months, and years following the initial hazard event. Although it is not clear the 
degree to which time influences each factor, it should be considered in the ensuing 
discussion. 
Although time was a component to all factors, there are a few elements of time 
worth noting. Time is not going away. Nonprofits are overworked and lack the necessary 
time to complete all of the tasks and activities assigned to them. Therefore, the time 
individuals were expected to devote to LVOAD activities competed with the time 
individuals had to devote to other professional and personal matters. This appeared to 
affect leadership the most as leadership needed to be present over time to successfully 
develop a LVOAD. This was apparent in all five LVOADs. Although it is clear that time 
is important, it should be noted that not much can be done with this factor. In the other 
creation and maintenance factors, there is room to manipulate the factors to influence the 
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creation and maintenance of a LVOAD. Since time continues at a constant rate, there is 
no way to manipulate it, which is what separates time from the other factors. However, 
time is a variable present in all the other factors and needs to be considered when 
contemplating the affect of each individual factor.  
The Creation Process 
In all five communities, the notion of a LVOAD was not brought up until after the 
communities experienced one or more hazard events. In all five cases, the hazard event 
served as the initial pressure to develop and form. The evidence suggests that one hazard 
event may not be enough to keep the LVOAD idea alive. The two communities that were 
only impacted by one hazard event did not become official LVOADs. The community 
that was in the process of becoming official at the time of data gathering had just recently 
been impacted by a second disaster, which seemed to have prompted the creation more 
than the initial hazard event. The other two communities became official LVOADs only 
after experiencing multiple hazard events. 
Earlier in this chapter, the notion of creating an entity that operates similar to 
NVOAD or SVOAD was considered. The findings of this study suggest that this is 
indeed possible, as two entities exist within FEMA’s Region VIII. Both of the 
communities that developed “official” LVOADs went through the same progressive 
stages starting with the hazard event(s), followed by the development of leadership, an 
organizational structure and culminating in official creation. This has direct implications 
for potential LVOADs, developing LVOADs, and official LVOADs. The basic process 
has been outlined and the major barriers have been identified. It would seem that one has 
only to use the information supplied by this study to explore and refine the ideas 
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presented here. However, it is not so simple. The findings in this study suggest that the 
LVOADs were aware of the barriers and were actively working to combat the issues with 
limited success. Two of the communities did not make it to the organizational structure 
stage and a third was in its infancy leaving only two communities with official LVOADs 
Although just making it to becoming an official LVOAD is a feat on its own, the 
findings suggest that LVOADs are incredibly difficult to maintain. In both communities 
that created official LVOADs, the leadership devoted a great deal of personal time and 
energy to continuing the LVOADs. Even with the devotion, time, and energy, one 
community was having a great deal of difficulty maintaining consistent leadership and 
the other had strong leadership but lacked membership participation. Throughout the 
interview process with members of these two LVOADs, there was a palpable air of 
positivity and pride in what the respective LVOADs had achieved and accomplished, but 
it is difficult to imagine that will be enough to keep the LVOADs alive. However, this 
comment should not be viewed with negativity. In both cases, the LVOADs had already 
been amazingly beneficial to their communities. 
This study also does not want to diminish the other groups of post-impact entities. 
LVOADs are not the only players in the post-impact environment. There are also Unmet 
Needs Committees (UNCs), Long-Term Recovery Committees (LTRCs), and Long-term 
Planning Committees (LTPCs), to name a few. However, these groups serve to 
emphasize the element of LVOADs that makes them so valuable. LTRCs, LTPCs, and 
UNCs are often ad hoc committees that form reactively to deal with response and 
recovery issues and disband when their goals are completed. LVOADs have an element 
of preparedness, which was emphasized in the two communities that became official 
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LVOADs. Therefore, it is unclear if it is feasible to expect LVOADs to function when 
not in a time of disaster. 
Limitations, Caveats, and Value 
It is generally assumed that coordination, communication, collaboration, and 
cooperation are important factors for communities to consider when preparing for and 
dealing with the effects of hazard event(s) (Alexander, 2010; Auf der Heide, 1989; 
Brudney & Gazley, 2009; Gillespie, 1991; Kapucu, Yuldashev, & Feldheim, 2011); 
Norris-Tirrell & Clay, 2006; Phillips, 2009; and Simo & Bies, 2007). Improving 
communication, coordination, collaboration, and cooperation across the multiple 
organizations involved with preparing for, responding to, and recovering from hazard 
events are the basic principles that guide a Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster 
(VOAD) (Egan & Tischler, 2010; National Organizations Active in Disaster, n.d.). It has 
also been recognized that limitations within governmental assistance leave communities 
with unmet needs that are largely left to local nonprofit organizations (Comfort, 1988; 
Drabek, 1985; Sylves, 2009; Waugh and Strieb, 2006). Therefore, it could be argued that 
there is an inherent value in creating and maintaining Local Voluntary Organizations 
Active in Disaster (LVOADs). Since this is the first and only exploration of the factors 
related to LVOAD creation and maintenance, in turn, it stands to offer tremendous value 
to knowledge of the function of emergency management. 
It is less clear how viable LVOADs are during persistent blue-sky situations. The 
findings from this study suggest that there are major challenges to overcome just getting 
the LVOAD created and even greater struggles to keep the LVOAD maintained. Even 
with dedicated and committed leadership, the continual forces exerted by the counter-
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pressures have negatively affected community participation. However, there are some 
major caveats that need to be considered. In addition to the limitations discussed in 
Chapter Three, one needs to take caution when contemplating the value of this study.  
This study only researched communities in FEMA’s Region VIII and those in the 
region all formed as a result of flooding. It is worth noting that, although this study 
targeted all LVOADs in FEMA’s Region VIII, participation was dominated by one state. 
This state’s specific emergency management system may differ from other states, but the 
degree to which it differs is unknown because of the relatively small data set. 
Additionally, there are many other geographical locations with different hazard events 
that may warrant a LVOAD, or currently have a LVOAD, and these communities are also 
in need of research. More research needs to be undertaken in areas where LVOADs have 
developed in response to other hazards such as tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes, and 
other hazards. In addition, there were two regional LVOADs that were excluded from 
this study. One was excluded because it was too large geographically to truly be 
considered local. The other community had an entity similar to a LVOAD but it was lead 
by for-profit organizations. Other than these two exclusions, all known LVOADs were 
involved in this study.  
Although limited to flooding, there was a great deal of consistency across the five 
communities regarding the factors influencing the creation of a LVOAD. This 
consistency adds strength to the study’s findings regarding the creation. Unfortunately, 
the findings regarding the maintenance were limited to only two LVOADs and are in 
need of further research. This study set out to explore this important topic and address a 
gap in the literature and has been successful in this regard despite the study’s limitations. 
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Implications 
 This study is the first of its kind. This research was not intended to produce 
answers, but to explore the factors that influence the creation and maintenance of 
LVOADs. In this task, it succeeded. This study has uncovered factors that can be added 
to and developed as new evidence is discovered. This study puts forth a new model 
illustrating how LVOADs are created and maintained, illustrated in Figure 1. This study 
serves as the foundation for future research and it has applications for academia and 
practice. 
Since this study is the first of its kind, it serves as a foundation for all other 
research of LVOADs. The findings reflect some fundamental factors that are in need of 
addition and refinement by future researchers. There is still much to be done regarding 
the distinction between Community Organizations Active in Disaster (COADs), 
LVOADs, and Regional VOADs, as none of them have clear definitions. In fact, in the 
process of data collection these terms were often used interchangeably. One participant 
referred to all of them as Geographical VOADs to avoid confusion. Evidence suggests 
that LVOADs are becoming more common and in need of greater attention from 
academics, particularly emergency management, as LVOADs serve an important 
function for emergency management professionals. The results also serve as a working 
model of LVOAD creation.  
These results should yield benefits for both emergency management theory and 
practice. There remains a significant gap in the literature on how these organizations are 
created and how they function within communities. Gazley (2013) suggests the breadth 
of this gap. 
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…very little is known about Community Organizations Active in Disaster 
(COADs), including how many groups are operational, their geographic 
distribution, scope of responsibilities, membership and activities. Also yet 
unmeasured are their accomplishments, such as their ability to leverage additional 
private sector voluntary resources or to empower their own constituents to 
participate more effectively in emergency planning (p. 4).  
LVOADs can potentially contribute significantly to the coordination of nonprofit 
organization (NPO) efforts at the local level. Local emergency managers and/or 
interested NPOs may be able to use the findings of this study to help initiate the 
development of a LVOAD in the community they serve and/or help an existing LVOAD 
with maintenance. Furthermore, the findings of this study could be integrated into 
training related to NPO involvement in disasters so that those taking the course have a 
better understanding of how LVOADs come to be and continue to serve communities 
over time. For more practical purposes, this study offers some considerations for 
individuals to contemplate if they are thinking of developing a LVOAD in their 
community. These considerations were developed based upon the factors discussed in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The considerations are presented Appendix F in the same order 
in which the factors were presented in the findings.  
The major factors seemed to follow a sequential order starting with the hazard 
event, followed by the development of leadership, followed by the formation of a 
LVOAD organizational structure, and ending with LVOAD maintenance (See Figure 1). 
Although the factors within each major creation factor did not follow a specific order, 
they were nonetheless essential to LVOAD creation. The maintenance factors had far less 
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support due to only examining two official LVOADs. The findings discovered in this 
study support that LVOADs would likely employ some type of housekeeping factors and 
evolving/expanding factors if they were to successfully maintain the LVOAD. However, 
there is much more research that needs to be done specifically focusing on official 
LVOADs. 
It is generally accepted that disasters are local events and the current 
governmental response to disasters necessitates a local response. Since local government 
is dependent on local resources provided largely by the nonprofit community, these 
resources need to be maximized with the growing number of disasters occurring across 
the nation. Local VOADs provide a vehicle for communities to better use the money, 
materials, and manpower that are essential for individual and household response and 
recovery. In addition, more research needs to focus on the preparedness capabilities of 
LVOADs, since it is another tool at the hands of emergency management professionals. 
Potential LVOAD organizations have much to gain from this study. This study outlines 
the necessary factors to form and develop LVOADs in a clear and concise manner. It also 
presents the potential factors that may negatively impact the LVOAD formation and 
gives some practical instruction on how combat these barriers. 
In addition to the general function of emergency management, city and county 
emergency managers have much to gain from the factors uncovered in this study. 
LVOADs have much to offer emergency managers. Since an emergency manager is 
responsible for coordinating resources in the aftermath of disaster, a LVOAD can 
conceivably make their job much easier. Since an emergency manager would normally 
coordinate with nonprofit organizations individually, a LVOAD allows them to reach a 
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large number of LVOAD organizations at one time. The tool located in Appendix F can 
aid emergency managers in identifying leadership that could potentially stimulate the 
creation of a LVOAD. This potentially reduces stress and allows time and energy to be 
spent on other important activities. 
Conclusion 
This chapter started with a return to the context surrounding LVOAD 
development. Next, a working model was presented and the findings were explored in 
greater detail. The next section discussed the limitations, caveats, and inherent value of 
the study. The chapter closed with implications for the profession and academic 
discipline of emergency management. The next chapter concludes with suggestions for 
future research. 	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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 	  
The nonprofit community was involved with aiding individuals impacted by 
disasters long before the government even had a role in responding to disasters. However, 
it was not until Hurricane Camille in 1969 that the nonprofit community decided to get 
together and coordinate their services in an attempt to eliminate duplication of effort and 
wasted resources. The result was the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster 
(NVOAD). NVOAD eventually expanded into an umbrella organization encompassing 
State Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (SVOADs), Regional Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disasters, and most recently the formation of Local Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disaster (LVOAD) across the nation. Prior to this study, 
LVOADs had not been researched leaving this study as the foundation for future research 
to build upon. 
This research studied five communities across FEMA’s Region VIII and explored 
the factors that influenced the creation and maintenance of LVOADs in their respective 
areas. The findings showed that the factors leading to the creation of LVOADs had a high 
degree of consistency across the five communities and progressed in three sequential 
stages culminating in the official creation of a LVOAD. Since only two communities 
developed official LVOADs, there was a higher degree of variance with the maintenance 
stage. The findings show that all communities were dependent on a hazard event to spark 
interest in LVOAD concept and the communities needed strong leadership to overcome 
the barriers and progress to the organizational structure stage of development.  
Once the communities reached this stage, they considered themselves to be 
official LVOADs and moved on into the maintenance stage and faced more barriers. To 
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overcome the barriers, the two LVOADs that made it to this stage engaged in 
housekeeping activities, attempted to evolve as an organization, and attempted to offer 
value to members. The findings show that communities likely need a specific sequence of 
events in order for a LVOAD to develop and they face greater barriers once they make it 
to the maintenance stage. The evidence suggests that LVOADs have a difficult time 
maintaining during Blue Sky situations when the LVOAD is between disasters or has 
gone long amounts of time without experiencing a disaster. Although the results do not 
offer a lot of optimism regarding the future of LVOADs, the findings do show that, 
where implemented, LVOADs hold a lot of potential to increase communication, 
collaboration, cooperation, and coordination across the LVOAD member and associate 
member organizations to include emergency management professionals.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This research has outlined several key factors that influence the creation and 
maintenance of a Local Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster (LVOAD). These 
factors were presented in a working model that future researchers need to further develop, 
change, and build upon. Since this study is the first exploration into LVOADs, future 
generations of researchers need to proceed with an open mind as they attempt to confirm 
the creation factors presented in this study and apply the factors to hazards other than 
flooding. Although there is no central directory of LVOADs, one need only inquire with 
the State Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster as to whether or not there are 
LVOAD operating within their states.  
 In addition to the creation factors much more research needs to be undertaken on 
the post creation stage. This study was limited to only two official LVOAD and there was 
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far more variance with maintenance factors. Although it is likely that any LVOAD would 
engage in housekeeping factors and some type of evolutionary actions, both factors need 
be reexamined for additions and improvements. The final factor, value of membership, 
needs particular attention, as it was the one identified specifically by only one 
community. 
 The suggestions thus far have been for more research of a similar qualitative 
nature as the one presented in these pages. However, there is also room for quantitative or 
mixed methods. The findings suggest that it takes multiple hazard events to trigger 
interest in LVOADs. However, it is not clear if the amount of damage is a major factor or 
the number of people affected. Quantitative approaches may also shine some light on the 
time factor that is so difficult to measure. Above all, more research needs to be 
undertaken as LVOADs hold a great deal of value to everyone involved in a disaster from 
the impacted individuals to the government officials assigned to the case. 	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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW INVITATION LETTER 
 
 
 
  
North Dakota State University 
Department of Emergency Management 
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management 
Department 2351 
P.O. Box 6050 
Fargo, ND 58108-6050 
(701) 231-5595 
 
 
 
Dear [Potential Participant Name], 
 
 
I am a graduate student in North Dakota State University’s emergency management 
program. I am currently conducting a study on the process involved with the creation of 
local VOADs.  
 
Presently, there has been little research on local VOADs.  I hope to get a better 
understanding of your perspective on the importance of local VOADs and any benefits 
they provide to their communities. 
 
I am eager to find out what you think and hope that you might be willing to share your 
thoughts. I am asking you to sit down for as long as your schedule will allow and chat 
with me about the process around creating the local VOAD in your area. If you are able 
and willing, I will meet you at a time convenient for you and at a location of your choice.  
If you are unable to meet face-to-face, I am also willing to do a telephone interview. 
 
Please feel free to contact me at james.jorissen@my.ndsu.edu or (701) 840-0853.  You 
may also contact my thesis advisor, Jessica Jensen, if you have any questions at 
ja.jensen@ndsu.edu or (701) 231-5762.  I look forward to hearing from you to schedule 
an interview and thank you for taking the time to read this letter. 
 
Best Regards, 
 
 
 
 
James Jorissen 
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APPENDIX D: INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
 
 
North Dakota State University 
Department of Emergency Management 
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management 
Department 2351 
P.O. Box 6050 
Fargo, ND 58108-6050 
(701) 231-5595 
  
 
 
 
“The Creation of Local Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster” 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
 
Research Study  
You are being invited to participate in a research project entitled “The Creation of Local Volunteer 
Organizations Active in Disasters.” This study is being conducted by James Jorissen, with the Center for 
Disaster Studies and Emergency Management, North Dakota State University. 
 
Purpose of Study 
There has been little research done on how Local VOADs are created.  This study intends to fill in this gap by 
obtaining a better understanding of who is involved and how they are created. 
 
Basis for Participant Selection  
You have been invited to participate in this research project because of your involvement with the creation of 
one of the four local VOADs in North Dakota.  The interview will last as long as your schedule permits and can 
end at any point if you so choose. 
  
Use of Recording Device 
Audio recordings will be obtained through the use of a digital audio recorder. Audio files of the interviews will 
be uploaded to James Jorissen's personal computer for transcription. Once the transcription is complete, the 
audio recording will be deleted. 
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts 
There should be no potential discomfort or physical, social, psychological, legal, or economic risk to you due to 
your participation in this study. 
 
Potential Benefits 
By participating in these interviews you would provide us important insight into how Local VOADs are created 
and what assists in their creation. The information gathered through these interviews will be used to educate 
students, academics, practitioners, and policy makers with training, practice, and policy related to disaster 
management.   
 
Assurance of Confidentiality 
There can be no assurance of confidentiality if you chose to participate in this study.  That being said, we will 
take steps to protect your privacy.  Your name and your organization’s name will not appear in published 
findings nor will your information be shared with other interviewees.   
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North Dakota State University 
Department of Emergency Management 
Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management 
Department 2351 
P.O. Box 6050 
Fargo, ND 58108-6050 
(701) 231-5595 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal from the Study 
Your participation is voluntary and you may quit at any time. Your decision whether or not to participate will 
not affect your present or future relationship with The Center for Disaster Studies and Emergency Management, 
North Dakota State University or any other benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you decide to 
participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at any time.  
 
Offer to Answer Questions  
You should feel free to ask questions now or at any time. If you have any questions, you can contact the lead 
researcher, James Jorissen, at (701) 840-0853 or james.jorissen@my.ndsu.edu.  You can also contact James 
Jorissen’s thesis advisor, Dr. Jessica Jensen, at (701) 231-8908 or ja.jensen@ndsu.edu.  If you have any 
questions about the rights of human research participants, or wish to report a research-related problem, contact 
the NDSU Institutional Research Board (IRB) Office at (701) 231-8908 or by email at ndsu.irb@ndsu.edu. 
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APPENDIX E: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 
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APPENDIX F: CONSIDERATIONS FOR LVOAD DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
The following tool was crafted to aid persons contemplating forming an LVOAD in their 
community. The considerations are organized according to the process of LVOAD 
development put forth by this study with the section headings listed in bold at the start of 
the section. The design of this tool begins with a series of questions followed by a 
rationale behind the questions. The questions are rhetorical, meaning they are not asking 
the reader for an answer, but rather meant to stimulate deeper thought or consideration.  
 
Hazard Threat 
 
§ Is your community under threat from a hazard? 
 
v Rationale: The findings from this study suggest that communities under 
threat from a hazard are more likely to develop a LVOAD, particularly 
when the hazard has recently manifested in more than one hazard event. 
 
§ Are there needs/unmet needs in your community that are not being met through 
other means? 
 
v Rationale: The findings from this study suggest that a community is more 
likely to develop a LVOAD if they have persistent unmet needs. 
Communities that fulfilled their needs through other means (Unmet Needs 
Committees, Long-term recovery Committees, or working groups) 
struggled to maintain relevance for continuing with a LVOAD. 
 
Leadership 
 
§ Have you contacted your local emergency management organizations, State 
VOAD, National VOAD, or FEMA to establish their level of support with 
forming an LVOAD? 
 
v Rationale: The findings from this study suggest that these 
organizations/entities provided critical support by contributing information 
and technical knowledge. These agencies can work with the community to 
offer technical knowledge on how to create a LVOAD, as well as 
informing the community on services and resources that may currently be 
available for individuals and households and also with respect to unmet 
needs post-disaster.  
 
§ Are you, or do you have, an individual from the nonprofit community that is 
motivated to start and maintain a LVOAD? 
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v This study suggests that a leader capable of motivating others to create a 
LVOAD is essential to forming an LVOAD and inspiring others to stay 
involved. 
 
§ Is there a core group of individuals from the nonprofit community that are willing 
to create and maintain a LVOAD? 
 
v The findings of this study suggest that a core group of motivated 
individuals are necessary to complete the tasks and activities necessary to 
create and maintain a LVOAD. There are far too many tasks and activities 
for any one individual to complete including recruitment, establishing 
meeting times and locations, and maintaining contact information, to name 
a few. 
 
Organizational Structure 
 
§ Have you contacted your State or National VOAD to request information 
regarding by-law formation or electoral processes?  
 
v The findings of this study suggest that the communities that formed 
official LVOADs used by-law templates provided by representatives from 
their State VOAD. The State VOAD by-laws closely mirrored those of the 
National VOAD. These by-laws were used as guidelines for a number of 
LVOAD tasks and activities including elections, leadership roles, 
conditions of membership, voting procedures, and financial management, 
to name a few. Therefore, the by-laws may be of use to those considering 
starting a LVOAD. 
 
§ Has your community attempted to recruit individuals/organizations from area 
nonprofits to gauge their interest in forming a LVOAD? 
 
v The findings suggest that gathering support from the local nonprofit and 
governmental community is important for building a strong foundation for 
LVOAD creation and maintaining an expansive LVOAD network.  
 
Barriers 
 
§ Do you have a plan to deal with burnout or meeting fatigue within your LVOAD 
leadership and membership, particularly surrounding maintaining active meeting 
participation? 
 
v The findings of this study suggest that LVOAD members will likely 
experience feeling of burnout and meeting fatigue, both of which were 
listed as two of the primary barriers to creating a LVOAD. 
 
§ Are there any ongoing disasters in your region? 
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v The findings suggest that larger, more salient, disasters can divert attention 
and resources from smaller hazard events. The communities that 
experienced disaster competition noted difficulty maintaining active 
membership, due to members migrating to the larger scale disasters. 
 
§ Are you prepared to deal with turnover of members and leadership? 
 
v The findings of this study suggest that staff turnover can be problematic, 
especially amongst LVOAD leadership. The findings suggest that 
planning for turnover helped maintain knowledgeable individuals in the 
key leadership positions. 
 
§ Are you prepared to deal with turf issues amongst the nonprofit community? 
 
v The findings suggest that turf issues, particularly within the nonprofit 
community, are likely to occur when developing a LVOAD. However, the 
findings suggest that working through turf issues can also strengthen the 
LVOAD in the long-term. 
 
§ Are you prepared to deal with complacency in the event that your community 
experiences prolonged periods without threat of a hazard event? 
 
v The findings of this study suggest that complacency becomes an issue as 
more and more time elapses between hazards events. The findings suggest 
that complacency can result in loss of membership participation. 
 
The considerations listed above outline the important factors noted as important to 
LVOAD creation by participants from the five LVOADs in this study. The factors were 
followed with a list of the primary barriers that impeded LVOAD creation and 
maintenance. The remainder of this tool is devoted to maintenance considerations with 
some helpful suggestions on ways to deal with the barriers. 
 
General Housekeeping, LVOAD evolution, & Value of Membership 
 
§ How are you planning to manage finances? 
 
v Although the LVOAD is not an action group that deals with allocation of 
money or resources, it may require some financial support to pay for 
expenses such as educational materials, professional speakers, trainings, 
workshops, and so forth. The findings of this study suggest that LVOADs 
can charge annual membership dues to pay for these expenses. If dealing 
with finances, the LVOADs in this study noted that it was important to use 
a third party to handle the finances. The decisions to determine who uses 
the money and how the money was to be used were made through 
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democratic voting as defined in the by-laws. How are you planning to 
manage finances? 
 
§ How often do you plan to revisit and revise the by-laws? 
 
v The findings of this study suggest that treating the by-laws as a working 
document was important with ensuring the LVOAD was operating within 
its scope. Participants noted that it was helpful to revisit the by-laws at 
least annually and to revisit and revise them as necessary to meet 
unforeseen challenges. 
 
§ How do you plan to maintain up-to-date information? 
 
v The findings of this study suggest that maintaining updated information is 
very challenging. Information pertains to member contact information, 
social media (Facebook page, website, blog, twitter), meeting schedules, 
and meeting minutes. Assigning responsibility for updating information 
may help ensure that they are being maintained. 
 
 
§ Do you have local schools and universities in your area that may be able to offer 
interns? 
 
v The findings of this study suggest that interns are valuable resources 
because they are able to devote time and energy, specifically to address 
the needs of the LVOAD. In addition, interns may possess technical 
knowledge and expertise that the LVOAD may be able to use to their 
advantage. The findings of this study identified intern tasks included 
writing by-laws, updating contact information, updating social media, and 
creating tools to track available resources, to name a few. 
 
 
§ How do you intend to maintain meeting participation? 
 
v The findings of this study suggest maintaining member participation can 
be problematic, particularly when not in times of disaster. You will have 
to decide how often the LVOAD will meet and what will be offered to 
members if they participate. The findings suggest participation was 
increased when the LVOAD offered new and relevant speakers or 
trainings.   
 
§ What other hazards do you intend to focus on? 
 
v The findings suggest it is important to take an all-hazards approach with 
LVOAD planning. Participants noted an all-hazards approach can help 
deal with issues such as burnout and complacency. 
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§ How are you planning on offering value for members? 
 
v The findings suggest that it is important to offer members value since they 
are expected to devote their time and energy towards the LVOAD. 
LVOAD can offer value with membership by recognizing members and 
providing relevant education and training opportunities. 
 
The purpose of this tool is not to persuade you on whether or not to create a LVOAD in 
your community; the goal is offer a snapshot of the many factors one needs to consider 
when contemplating LVOAD development to better prepare you for the challenges that 
lie ahead. The findings suggest communities that identified and addressed the 
considerations presented above were more likely to see successful LVOAD creation. 
 
 
